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 "Strong situations" have been shown to decrease behavioral variability, thereby 
attenuating the criterion-related validity of non-ability individual differences for criteria such as 
job performance (Barrick & Mount, 1993; Meyer, Dalal, & Bonaccio, 2009). However, it has 
been suggested that individuals, based on individual differences in implicit motives, may impute 
discrepant psychological meaning to social stimuli like situational strength—a process 
sometimes known as differential framing (James & McIntyre, 1996). If different psychological 
interpretations are attached to strong situation stimuli (e.g., Meyer, Dalal, & Hermida, 2010), an 
interesting behavioral "double-edged sword" is possible. On the one hand, behaviors pertinent to 
"primary criteria" (i.e., criteria for which external situational influences and pressures lead to 
targeted behavioral homogeneity) may occur among those who would not normally engage in 
them. But, at the same time, behaviors pertinent to "secondary criteria" (i.e., unintended, 
unforeseen, and potentially reactionary behaviors and/or attitudes) might also increase for some 
individuals (i.e., those with certain implicit motive characteristics). 
 In other words, high situational strength may simultaneously constrain behavioral 
variability in primary criteria while serving as a stimulus for differential framing, thereby 
expanding variability on secondary criteria. The purpose of the present dissertation was twofold: 
1) to explore the degree to which situational strength is differentially framed, and 2) to ascertain 
how the differential framing of situational strength may lead to unintended secondary outcomes.  
 Study 1 findings indicate that, to a partial extent, situational strength is differentially 
framed by individuals with different implicit motives. Study 2 findings are largely consistent 







 The field of Industrial/Organizational (I/O) psychology has seen a growing interest in the 
conceptualization and assessment of work situations (e.g., Cooper & Withey, 2009; Johns, 2006; 
Kanfer, Chen, & Pritchard, 2008; Meyer, Dalal, & Hermida, 2010). Some have argued that one 
of the most important situational variables to consider when predicting human behavior is 
situational strength (Meyer & Dalal, 2009; Snyder & Ickes, 1985). Situational strength has been 
shown to restrict the manifestation of non-ability individual differences (Mischel, 1973; Weiss & 
Adler, 1984), thereby moderating relevant personality-outcome relationships (Barrick & Mount, 
1993; Meyer, Dalal, & Bonaccio, 2009). Although the distinction between "strong" and "weak" 
situations has been useful, a complete appreciation of the influence of situations requires the 
acknowledgment that "contextual factors cannot be disembedded from the psychological 
meaning given to them by the individual" (Deci & Ryan, 1987, p. 1033; see also: Endler & 
Magnusson, 1976; James & Jones, 1974; Schneider, 1975).  
 This perspective is especially relevant, given that previous research suggests that there 
are individual differences in the cognitive construction of social stimuli that are associated with 
individual differences in personality (James & Mazerolle, 2002). This phenomenon is known as 
differential framing, defined here as the notion that individuals with different implicit motives 
may impute qualitatively discrepant psychological meaning to the same social stimuli (James & 
McIntyre, 1996), thereby yielding divergent behavioral and/or affective reactions. Thus, although 
a preponderance of theory and research indicates that situational strength is primarily associated 
with a decrease in personality-driven behavioral variability, differential framing suggests that 




even situations that homogenize behavior in a targeted manner (i.e., strong situations) have the 
potential to yield very different psychological interpretations and, therefore, behaviors and 
attitudes. Further, according to the central tenets of differential framing, these interpretations and 
secondary outcomes should be able to be predicted on an a priori basis by understanding one's 
individual differences profile. 
 As such, the current manuscript begins by reviewing situational strength's historical 
context, salient research, and recent conceptualizations. Next, two approaches to understanding 
the influence of situational variables are compared and contrasted (i.e., a "stimulus-response 
approach" and a "social-cognitive approach"). Despite the historical dominance of the univariate, 
stimulus-response approach, it is posited that a social-cognitive approach is better equipped to 
account for the ways in which situational variables are differentially construed by different types 
of individuals. Relevant theory, evidence, and implications regarding this assertion are discussed, 
and a methodology for testing its effects vis-à-vis situational strength is presented.  
Situational Strength 
 Situational strength is a contextual variable hypothesized to restrict the manifestation of 
non-ability individual differences (Schneider & Hough, 1995; Snyder & Ickes, 1985; Weiss & 
Adler, 1984), thereby attenuating relevant trait-outcome relationships. This construct is 
specifically defined as: 
 implicit or explicit cues provided by external entities regarding the desirability of 
 potential behaviors. Situational strength is posited to result in psychological pressure on 
 the individual to engage in and/or refrain from particular courses of action; this pressure, 
 in turn, is posited to reduce relevant behavioral variance and attenuate subsequent trait-




Given its place in the history of interactionist thought (e.g., Forehand & von Haller Gilmer, 
1964; Hattrup & Jackson, 1996; March & Simon, 1958; Weiss & Adler, 1984) and its standing 
as an important contextual variable in the organizational sciences (e.g., Kanfer, Chen, & 
Pritchard, 2008; Hough & Oswald, 2008; Murphy & Dzieweczynski, 2005), the next several 
paragraphs provide a brief overview of its historical and conceptual underpinnings. 
 Theory and research on situational strength stems from a long debate over the relative 
influence of person and situation factors on human behavior. Popularly known as "the person-
situation debate," this is essentially a non-issue now, as a majority of researchers (cf. Chatman, 
1989; Magnusson & Endler, 1977; Meyer et al., 2009; Schneider, 1983; Terborg, 1981) 
subscribe to an interactionist position (i.e., a philosophy wherein both person and situation 
factors are viewed as important determinants of behavior). For instance, in some situations (e.g., 
a red traffic light, working under a micro-managing boss, a formal ceremony), the external cues 
for behavior are so clear/overwhelming that they attenuate the predictive impact of person-
factors. On the other hand, in other situations (e.g., a yellow traffic light, working from home, 
grabbing beers with friends), the contextual demands are much less overt, thereby making 
personality a more important predictor of subsequent behavior. 
 Situational strength becomes relevant to this discussion because, where useful 
taxonomies for person factors have been created (e.g., cognitive ability: Cattell, 1971; Guilford, 
1956; McGrew, 2005; Thurstone & Thurstone, 1941; personality: Digman, 1990), less work has 
been dedicated to uncovering and classifying salient situational dimensions (Funder, 2006; 
Johns, 2006). Despite this gap in the research literature, it has been posed that the "strength" of 




characteristics may begin (Hattrup & Jackson, 1996; Hough & Oswald, 2008; Snyder & Ickes, 
1985).   
Seminal Research 
 Though theory and research on situational strength is most often associated with the work 
of Walter Mischel (1968, 1973, 1977), conceptually-related work in this area actually began 
substantially earlier (e.g., Forehand & von Haller Gilmer, 1964; March & Simon, 1958; Rogers, 
1954; Weber, 1958, 1922/1978). Nevertheless, Mischel is most often credited with recognizing 
the "strength" of a situation as an important variable to consider when studying personality. For 
example, Mischel (1977) wrote that: 
 Psychological "situations" (stimuli, treatment) are powerful to the degree that they lead  
 everyone to construe the particular events the same way, induce uniform expectancies 
 regarding the most appropriate response pattern, provide adequate incentives for the 
 performance of that response pattern and require skills that everyone has to the same 
 extent...Conversely, situations are weak to the degree that they are not uniformly 
 encoded, do not generate uniform expectancies concerning the desired behavior, do not 
 offer sufficient incentives for its performance, or fail to provide learning conditions 
 required for successful genesis of the behavior (p. 347). 
An example provided by this author of a strong situation is a red traffic light. That is, most 
drivers likely perceive this event as a signal to "STOP!" have the same expectancies about the 
best course of action (e.g., begin braking), adequate incentives (e.g., avoid a ticket or car 
accident), and similar abilities to stop. On the other hand, Mischel (1977) used the Thematic 
Apperception Test (Murray, 1938) as an example of a weak situation. In this psychological 




asked to create a story about what is happening in the picture. As Mischel (1977) remarked, 
"clearly the answers depend more on the storytellers than on the card" (p. 347).  
 More recently, and more specific to I/O psychology, Barrick and Mount (1993) found 
that in jobs with higher levels of autonomy (i.e., lower situational strength), personality was a 
better predictor of job performance than in those with lower autonomy (i.e., higher situational 
strength). Beaty, Cleveland, and Murphy (2001) investigated the moderating effect of situational 
strength in both the laboratory and the field. In both settings, these researchers found that the 
relationship between personality and self-reported intention to engage in positive contextual 
performance behaviors was moderated by situational strength. Meyer et al. (2009) found similar 
results when they meta-analytically examined occupation-level situational strength as a 
moderator of the conscientiousness-job performance relationship. These authors operationalized 
situational strength through occupation-level “constraints” and “consequences.” 
Recent Conceptualizations 
 Recent work by Meyer and colleagues (Meyer, et al., 2009; Meyer, et al., 2010; Meyer, et 
al., in press) has led to important conceptual advances in the construct development of situational 
strength. Most relevant to the current efforts, Meyer et al. (2010) presented a facet structure to 
further define and elucidate situational strength's construct space. Their framework, called the "4 
C's of situational strength" includes the following facets: clarity, consistency, constraints, and 
consequences. A summary of definitions is provided in Appendix A.  
 Clarity is defined as "the extent to which cues regarding work-related responsibilities or 
requirements are available and easy to understand" (Meyer et al. 2010, p. 125). Higher clarity is 
theoretically associated with increased behavioral homogeneity because expected behaviors for 




Babcock, and McGinn (2005) on "structural ambiguity," or the "degree of uncertainty in parties' 
understanding of the economic structure" (p. 952) of a negotiation. In situational strength terms, 
the higher the situational ambiguity (i.e., the lower the clarity) the weaker the situation. Bowles 
et al. (2005) found results consistent with overall situational strength theory, in that situational 
ambiguity moderated gender effects in simulated negotiations. 
 The second facet proposed by Meyer et al. (2010) is consistency, which is best described 
as "the extent to which cues regarding work-related responsibilities or requirements are 
compatible with each other" (Meyer et al., 2010, p. 126). Higher consistency is theoretically 
associated with increased behavioral homogeneity because various sources of information 
provide consistent messages about appropriate course(s) of action in the workplace. After their 
comprehensive review of diverse research literatures, these researchers cited Bacharach and 
Bamberger (2007) as a noteworthy empirical example of the consistency facet of situational 
strength. This particular operationalization centers on "supervisory support climate." This line of 
research, consistent with situational strength theory, demonstrated that when firefighters exposed 
to the events of September 11th received consistent messages of support from multiple 
supervisors, behavioral variability decreased (i.e., psychological disturbance was lessened, and 
more healthy choices were made, like seeing a psychological counselor). 
 Meyer et al. (2010) defined a third facet of situational strength, constraints, as "the extent 
to which an individual's freedom of decision and action is limited by forces outside his or her 
control" (p. 126). Higher levels of constraints are theoretically associated with increased 
behavioral homogeneity because situational influences constrain the employee from acting in 
accordance with individual difference-based tendencies. As an example, researchers have noted 




turnover due to a lack of legitimate alternatives (Gerhart, 1990; Mobley, Griffeth, Hand, & 
Meglino, 1979). Previous research also suggests that the relationship between job satisfaction 
and voluntary turnover is weaker during a recession, again presumably reflecting the lack of 
opportunity to move elsewhere (Carsten & Spector, 1987; Hom, Caranikas-Walker, Prussia, & 
Griffeth, 1992; Trevor, 2001). Put in situational strength terms, the lack of other job 
opportunities (and the need to keep the job one has) may constrain one's natural tendency to 
voluntarily move from one job to another. Thus, the strong situational constraints imposed by the 
recession have the potential to render individual differences in personality less predictive of 
actual behavior in the workplace (Cappelli & Sherer, 1991). 
 Lastly, the consequences facet of situational strength is defined as "the extent to which 
decisions or actions have important positive or negative implications for any relevant person or 
entity" (Meyer et al., 2010, p. 127). Higher consequences are theoretically associated with 
increased behavioral homogeneity because the potential for positive and/or negative outcomes 
motivates and/or dissuades individuals from acting in accordance with their individual 
difference-based behavioral proclivities. In a meta-analytic investigation, Meyer et al. (2009) 
examined this particular facet of situational strength and found that in occupations where job-
level consequences were high (i.e., a nuclear plant operator), the relationship between 
conscientiousness and job performance was attenuated. These authors reasoned that the potential 
for serious adverse outcomes leads to conscientious behaviors among employees, regardless of 
their levels of trait conscientiousness.  
 In sum, all of the four facets are thought to represent a unique and important portion of 
situational strength's construct space. With that said, "each operationalization is posited to 




127). To this point, a primary purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the degree to which 
these four facets are differentially framed. 
The Influence of Situations 
 Currently, much of the situational strength literature is characterized by a "stimulus-
response" approach to situational strength. That is, situational strength is often examined as 
though it affects individuals in essentially the same manner (i.e., behavioral homogeneity on a 
primary criterion). In this approach, resultant data are aggregated across individuals, and thus say 
little about how or why any one individual (or group of similar individuals) attaches 
psychological meaning to various operationalizations of situational strength (e.g., Meyer et al., 
2010). This is a particularly vexing issue for situational strength research because it is unlikely 
that humans will only respond in one universal way to strong situations. Thus, it is posited here 
that a "social-cognitive" approach to understanding situational strength's multiple behavioral 
influences represents a fruitful next step in the progression of this literature, as various types 
and/or levels of situational strength may have different psychological meaning for certain types 
of individuals, which likely has implications for unanticipated or secondary behaviors (e.g., 
Meyer et al., 2010).  
A "Social-Cognitive" Approach to Situations 
 The social-cognitive approach provides an important dimension to extant situational 
strength research because a number of researchers have argued that the interpretation of the 
situation, rather than the situation itself, is often a more important determinant of behaviors and 
attitudes (Bowers, 1973; Deci & Ryan, 1987; Endler, 1981; Endler & Magnusson, 1976; Forgas, 
1982; Geertz, 1973; Hattrup & Jackson, 1996; Hettema, 1979; James, 1982; Kelly, 1955; Lewin, 




1990). Returning to the Barrick and Mount (1993) job autonomy investigation, social-cognitive 
theorizing (e.g., James, 1998) suggests, but has not directly tested, that certain individuals (i.e., 
those with a strong implicit motive to achieve) may be pre-disposed to frame "a lack of 
autonomy" as "restrictive," whereas other individuals (i.e., those with a strong implicit motive to 
avoid failure) may frame "a lack of autonomy" as "safe." 
 Thus, the social-cognitive view of situations extends current thinking by proposing that 
discrepant perceptions may have implications beyond primary criteria such as job performance. 
That is, there may be secondary outcomes for individuals who frame "a lack of autonomy" as 
"restrictive" that would likely be of interest to researchers and practitioners. For example, these 
individuals may be less satisfied at work, and thus more likely to turnover in pursuit of a job they 
frame as less "unrestrictive." Because of their role in the potential differential framing of 
situational strength, a discussion of implicit motives, as well as potential ways in which 
situational strength could be discrepantly construed, is outlined in the following sections.  
The Role of Implicit Motives 
 Implicit motives, as defined by James and Rentsch (2004, p. 224), are comprised of two 
key characteristics:   
 (a) components of cognitive structure and cognitive process that determine individuals' 
 perceptual, emotional, and behavioral adjustments to environments (see Allport, 1937; 
 James & Mazerolle, 2002) that (b) are not accessible to introspection by the individual 
 (cf. Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Kihlstrom, 1999; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Winter, John, 
 Stewart, Klohnen, & Duncan, 1998). 
Because motives have the potential to "strongly influence the direction, intensity, and persistence 




described as the "core explanatory mechanisms of personality" (James & Rentsch, 2004, p. 223; 
see also Buss & Cantor, 1989; Emmons, 1989; James & Mazerolle, 2002; Maddi, 1989; 
McClelland, 1985; Mischel & Shoda, 1998). The role that implicit motives play in the biasing of 
social perception and reasoning is also important (e.g., James & Mazerolle, 2002), and is further 
detailed in the following.  
Differential Framing 
 In the organizational sciences, the notion that implicit motives produce discrepant 
subjective meanings for the same social stimuli is called differential framing (James & McIntyre, 
1996; James & Mazerolle, 2002).This is because motives have the potential to: 
 guide us to interpret an ambiguous stimulus in a certain manner; direct our focus of 
 attention on certain aspects of the environment, ignoring others; embellish input 
 information to make it more easily retrieved; offer us a warning of potential threat; [and] 
 enter into our choice of responses in a difficult decision process (Rogers, 1981, p. 194).  
Thus, if one possesses a strong implicit motive to avoid failure, this individual is likely to 
demonstrate patterns of cognition (e.g., "accepting this promotion will put me in a position to 
have my weaknesses exposed") and behavioral patterns (e.g., "I'll play it safe if I have to take 
this promotion, so I don't make mistakes") that are consistent with said motive. If, on the other 
hand, one possesses a strong motive to achieve, then this individual is likely to frame the 
prospect of a job promotion in a different manner (e.g., "accepting this promotion is an 
opportunity to show what I've got") and act in accordance with both the framing and implicit 
motive (e.g., "when I'm in charge I'll hit the ground running; nothing ventured, nothing gained").  
 Further, such patterns of cognition reinforce the motive such that it appears rational or 




Isen, 1984; James & McIntyre, 1996; Rusting, 1998). Cervone and Shoda (1999) noted that 
"people create explanations for their experiences and try to tie them together into a coherent 
theory that encompasses many aspects of their lives" (p. 22). For instance, an individual with a 
strong motive to aggress may view oneself as someone who is incessantly victimized by 
powerful others, and thus seeks justified revenge (James, 1998). Such implicit biases in 
reasoning reinforce this motive, as the individual frames his/her behavior as justified, socially-
sanctioned (aggressive) behavior (James & Mazerolle, 2002). 
The Role of Justification Mechanisms in Differential Framing 
 The work of James and colleagues (1998; James et al., 2004, 2005) has been essential in 
elucidating implicit mechanisms that may shape the reasoning that results in differential framing. 
Most important are justification mechanisms (JMs), or the implicit biases that "enhance the 
rational the appeal of motive-based behavior" (James & Mazerolle, 2002, p. 207). JMs are 
inextricably tied to differential framing because with JMs, individuals have a mechanism through 
which they are able to frame stimuli in ways that protect and reinforce underlying motives (cf. 
Crick & Dodge, 1994; Isen, 1984; James & McIntyre, 1996; Rusting, 1998). Thus: "when these 
qualitatively different JMs are mapped onto perceptions of the same behaviors, people, 
environments, or events with the implicit purpose of justifying different behaviors, we have 
differential framing" (James & Mazerolle, 2002, p. 207). 
 The hostile attribution bias, or the proclivity for attributing hostile intent in others, is a 
JM that likely plays a prominent role in this process. For example, one whose reasoning is 
characterized by this implicit bias may frame a genuinely nice gesture as an action that has a 
hidden agenda, such as a ploy to obtain power. One whose reasoning is more prosocially-




in a qualitatively different way (e.g., "it is just a genuinely nice gesture"). Because James's 
(1998) JMs are posited here to serve as a basis for differential framing, full definitions of each 
can be found in Appendix B.  
Supporting Evidence of Differential Framing 
 LeBreton (2002) directly tested differential framing by using an implicit motive-based 
measure, the Conditional Reasoning Test of Aggression (CRT-A), to predict performance on a 
"synonyms test," where each item had two logical choices: one reflecting an aggressive 
interpretation and one reflecting a prosocial interpretation. It was proposed that CRT-A scores 
would be positively associated with one's choice of aggressive alternatives, though evidence was 
mixed: across three samples the strongest correlation between these two measures was .22 (p < 
.05), where in other samples, correlations were modest and non-significant. McMahon (2009) 
also directly tested this phenomenon, but with regard to the achievement motivation/fear of 
failure constructs. Again, results were mixed: the strongest correlation was .23 (p < .01), whereas 
other relationships were not significantly different from zero. 
 Though not conducted specifically to investigate differential framing per se, other data 
exist that provide indirect evidence for this phenomenon. For instance, early researchers 
(Goodstein, 1954; Haney, 1973; Phares, 1961) found that individuals high in negative affectivity 
(NA) are more likely to interpret ambiguous stimuli negatively. High NA individuals are also 
more likely to frame themselves as the cause of failures, and to draw on these experiences to 
make generalizations about themselves (Peterson & Seligman, 1984). Connor and Abraham 
(2001) found that participants higher in conscientiousness framed goals and goal setting in more 
positive terms than their low conscientiousness counterparts. Buss (1996) presented evidence of 




Specifically, he found that highly conscientious individuals view making one's mate jealous as 
the most effective strategy, highly extraverted individuals view showing off for one's mate as the 
most effective strategy, and highly agreeable individuals view  showing an abundance of 
affection as the most effective strategy.  
 Further, similar findings have been found for a number of other constructs for myriad 
social stimuli, including aggression's influence on attributing hostile intent in social situations 
(Crick & Dodge, 1994), prosocial and pro-self personality orientations' influence on fairness 
judgments (Anderson & Patterson, 2008), self-efficacy's influence on perceptions of difficult 
tasks and demands (Bandura, 1999; Caprara & Cervone, 2000), achievement motivation/fear of 
failure's influence on performance interpretations (Dweck & Leggett, 1988), and rejection 
sensitivity's influence on rejection in social situations (Mischel & Shoda, 1998). Thus, in order to 
add a sense of theoretical coherence to this diverse literature, situational strength is explored here 
as a key social stimulus for differential framing.  
The Differential Framing of Situational Strength 
 As previously noted, some researchers have downplayed the importance objective or 
surface-level contextual characteristics on affect and behavior, instead emphasizing the 
psychological meaning that an individual attaches to situational features like situational strength 
(Deci & Ryan, 1987; Endler & Magnusson, 1976; Forgas & Van Heck, 1992; Hattrup & 
Jackson, 1996; James & Jones, 1974; Lewin, 1936; Mischel, 1973; Rogers, 1951; Schneider, 
1975). Further, differential framing theory suggests that there may be individual differences in 
the cognitive construction of operationalizations of situational strength. Thus, although a 
preponderance of research indicates that situational strength is associated with a decrease in 




framing suggests that unintended (and potentially unwanted) secondary outcomes of situational 
strength are also possible among employees with particular motive profiles. The focal implicit 
motive for this dissertation is discussed below, followed by examples of the ways in which 
situational strength may be differentially framed. 
The Implicit Motive to Aggress 
 The implicit motive to aggress is defined as a "desire to overcome opposition forcefully, 
to fight, to revenge an injury, to attack another with intent to injure or kill, and to oppose 
forcefully or punish another (Murray, 1938)" (James et al., 2005, p. 72). Those with a strong 
motive to aggress (AGs) are "overly sensitive to social cues conveying hostile or malevolent 
intent and have difficulties in evaluating the value of alternative or positively valued 
information" (Zelli & Dodge, 1999, p. 102). Thus, it is generally proposed that those with a high 
implicit motive to aggress, in comparison to those with no or little motive to aggress, are more 
likely to evaluate situational strength through a lens of hostility, dominance versus 
submissiveness, oppression, injustice, and so forth (James et al., 2004). This is not to say that the 
motive to aggress is the only individual differences variable relevant to the differential framing 
of situational strength, but ceteris paribus, empirical evidence indicates that AGs are likely to 
interpret the presence of situational strength in a hostile manner. As such, the following section 
goes into greater detail by exploring the ways in which the JMs of aggression (James et al., 
2005) pertain to the four facets of situational strength (Meyer et al., 2010). 
Justification Mechanisms & the Four Facets 
 In this section, propositions are made regarding how individuals whose reasoning is 
dominated by specific JMs of aggression (James et al., 2005) may frame strong situations. The 




behavioral variability in a targeted fashion (i.e., increased job performance) have the potential to 
generate very different psychological interpretations (i.e., differential framing). This is important 
because these discrepant psychological reactions may provide the basis for unwanted or 
unintended secondary behaviors and attitudes (e.g., decreased job satisfaction, retributive 
behaviors like stealing and sabotage), a point that is further explored in the next section of this 
paper. 
 Previous research indicates that aggressive individuals are overly attentive to or 
perceptive of situational cues that "merit" an aggressive response (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Zelli & 
Dodge, 1999). The current discussion goes into further detail, however, by integrating research 
on JMs from James and colleagues (James, 1998, James et al., 2004, 2005) with recent 
developments of the facet structure of situational strength made by Meyer and colleagues (Meyer 
et al., 2009, 2010). In the following, relevant definitional information for the most salient JMs of 
aggression will be provided, as well as a discussion regarding how situational strength may serve 
as a useful framework for conceptualizing one set of environmental stimuli that may be 
differentially framed. 
 Perhaps the most popular JM in the research literature is the hostile attribution bias, 
defined as "the tendency to see malevolent intent in actions of others" (James et al., 2004, p. 
275). Given this definition, it is proposed that individuals whose reasoning is dominated by this 
bias will generally frame the use or presence of situational strength as a stimulus that is intended 
to subtly undermine or harm the individual through the guise of "legitimate" organizational 
practices. It is proposed that this particular JM is relevant to the differential framing of all four 
facets of situational strength. For instance, the clarity and consistency facets both have the 




consequences facet may be framed as attempts to bully or frighten employees into obedience, 
while the constraints facet may be viewed as a hostile attempt to undermine one's performance 
for nefarious reasons (e.g., to prevent the subordinate from outshining the supervisor).  
 Another potentially relevant JM is the potency bias, which leads individuals to interpret 
social stimuli through a prism of dominance versus submissiveness (James et al. 2005, p. 74). 
Thus, individuals driven by this reasoning bias are likely to view general situational strength as a 
means through which one's supervisor or the organization at large may attempt to assert 
dominance and engender submissiveness. Much like the hostile attribution bias discussed 
previously, this particular JM may cut across all four facets of situational strength, in that 
submitting to any or all of the four is a weak and cowardly response to an attempt at being 
dominated. 
 The victimization by powerful others bias is defined as the propensity to frame one's "self 
as a victim and to see self as being exploited and taken advantage of by the powerful" (James et 
al., 2004, p. 275). Individuals with this particular bias may frame the constraints facet, for 
example, as an instance in which one's supervisor is wielding his/her power to oppress and 
undermine the individual's productivity and work reputation. It is also possible that the 
consistency facet is framed as one in which organizational forces (i.e., supervisors, management 
team, organizational culture, etc.) collectively conspire to "pigeon-hole me into doing a select list 
of tasks." That is, aggressive individuals perceive social cues pertaining to externally endorsed 
behaviors as a form of manipulation by powerful others (e.g., James, 1998), which is consistent 
with viewing this facet through a conspiratorial lens. The consequences facet may also be viewed 




 One whose social reasoning is driven by a retribution bias will frame the gaining of 
revenge as more important than forgiveness or maintaining a relationship (James et al., 2005, p. 
74). Thus, if an "individual's freedom of decision and action is limited by forces outside his or 
her control" (i.e., constraints; Meyer et al., 2010, p. 126), an individual whose reasoning is driven 
by a retribution bias may seek revenge for what are perceived to be disrespectful attempts to 
control one's work responsibilities (e.g., Brehm, 1966). For example, if a customer service 
representative has to complete 100 calls before he or she is allowed to leave for the day or else 
risk termination (i.e., strong consequences), it is likely that the majority of employees will 
complete this requirement. However, an individual with a proclivity to view social stimuli 
through the prism of a retribution bias may also react by finding ways to implicitly justify 
retaliating against one's supervisor or organization for "unjustified abuses of power," for 
example.  
 The derogation of target bias refers to a proclivity whereby individuals frame social 
stimuli that are the target of "justified" aggression as evil or untrustworthy (James et al., 2005, p. 
74). Individuals whose reasoning is driven by this particular bias should be more likely to view 
the use or presence of situational strength as underhanded, corrupt, unethical, or untrustworthy, 
and thus deserving of an aggressive reaction. Through this social perception bias, individuals 
may frame the consequences facet of situational strength as akin to intimidation tactics. 
Manifestations of the constraints facet of situational strength may be viewed as underhanded 
and/or unethical ways in which the organization prevents employees from performing their jobs 
in their own way and stunting their professional development.  
 The preceding section outlined the ways in which operationalizations of situational 




hostile manner, they would react in accordance with this framing, thus opening the possibility of 
secondary outcomes of situational strength. This prediction is further developed in the following 
section.  
Secondary Outcomes of Situational Strength 
 Meyer et al. (2010) presented a potential paradox for some workers regarding issues of 
occupational safety and psychological well-being. That is, let us say that management at a paper 
mill standardizes procedures such that tasks are to be carried out in a very detailed, methodical, 
step-by-step process, in order minimize costly and/or potentially harmful mistakes. This would 
be an example of increasing situational strength and is likely to restrict criterion variance and 
attenuate the impact of relevant individual differences on predictions of performance. What 
Meyer et al. (2010) point out, however, is that previous research suggests that some employees 
may view (or, differentially frame) such procedures as overly constraining and burdensome, 
which may decrease psychological health, even though they are designed to increase workplace 
safety and productivity (e.g., deCharms, 1968; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Shoda et al., 1994). They 
note: 
 Within the context of situational strength, some employees may view highly constraining 
 environments as stifling and frustrating, whereas others may find the regimented and 
 predictable nature of constraining environments to be comforting and relaxing (Meyer et 
 al., 2010, p. 135). 
As such, high situational strength may be a double-edged sword. Thus, a primary goal of the 
present dissertation is to better understand how one's implicit motives drive interpretations of and 




The Current Investigation 
 As conveyed throughout this proposal, the overarching purpose of this dissertation is to 
explore individual difference-based differential reactions to high situational strength. It was 
previously outlined how the implicit motive to aggress may lead to differential framing of 
situational strength. It is further proposed that individuals will largely act in accordance with 
their respective cognitive interpretations (i.e., differential framing). That is, if an individual 
frames very clear expectations (i.e., high clarity) as "domineering" instead of "instructive" (for 
example), it follows that behaviors and attitudes consistent with this hostile framing should 
follow. Thus, situational strength may simultaneously decrease behavioral variability on primary 
outcome(s) (i.e., performance; Meyer et al., 2009), while increasing observed variability on 
secondary outcome(s). A method for testing the potential for differential framing of situational 







 The intent of the first study was to explore implicit motive-based interpretations of 
situational strength. As described previously, James (1998) outlined how individuals with a 
strong motive to aggress (AGs) view social stimuli (particularly work-related social stimuli) 
through a prism of hostility, dominance, vengeance, and so forth. Researchers from other 
domains of psychological research (e.g., Dill, Anderson, & Deuser, 1997; Dodge, 1986; Dodge 
& Frame, 1982; Gouze, 1987; Matthews & Norris, 2002; Wilkowski, Robinson, Gordon, & 
Troop-Gordon, 2007) have also demonstrated that aggressive characteristics predispose 
individuals to perceive hostile intent, feel victimized, and so forth, in order to support the motive 
to aggress. Conversely, individuals with a weak or non-existent motive to aggress, hereafter 
referred to as prosocials (PSs), do not interpret social stimuli through this lens. Thus, consistent 
with the body of research outlined in Chapter 1, the first hypothesis examines the extent to which 
one's implicit motive to aggress is associated with hostile interpretations (i.e., differential 
framing) of situational strength: 
Hypothesis1: The implicit motive to aggress will be positively correlated with hostile 
interpretations of situational strength. 
Method 
Participants 
 A total of three hundred fifty one (351) students participated in this study for course extra 
credit. Data were collected via paper-and-pencil surveys in experimental sessions. 




Approximately 5% of the sample reported primary ethnicity as African American, 30% Asian, 
6% Hispanic, 54% Caucasian, and 3% as not indicated.  
Materials 
Predictor Measures 
Conditional Reasoning Test for Aggression (CRT-A) 
The CRT-A is an implicit measure of aggression that assesses one’s readiness to justify 
aggression. This assessment has 22 operational items that are constructed to look like inductive 
reasoning problems. That is, after reviewing a set of statements, respondents are to select one of 
four possible answers as the “most logical” response option. Each item contains a response 
indicative of an aggressive interpretation, a non-aggressive response, and two illogical distractor 
choices. James et al. (2004) reported internal consistency estimates of reliability of .76, and a .82 
alternative forms estimate of reliability. Research using the CRT-A has found an average 
uncorrected validity of .44 against behavioral indicators of aggression (James et al., 2005).  
Personality Research Form-E (PRF-E) 
The PRF-E is a 352 true/false item, non-clinical, self-report personality inventory based 
Murray’s needs model (Murray, 1938). The PRF-E has 20 subscales, with an additional two 
validity scales: Infrequency and Social Desirability. Other subscales include: Abasement, 
Achievement, Affiliation, Autonomy, Change, Cognitive Structure, Endurance, Exhibition, 
Harm Avoidance, Impulsivity, Nurturance, Order, Play, Sentience, Social Recognition, 
Succorance, Understanding, Infrequency, and Desirability. Each one of the 22 scales has 16 
items in a true-false answer format. Skinner, Jackson, and Rampton (1976) found median 
internal consistency values of .92, and a median test-retest value after one week of .81. Validity 




The PRF-E was utilized for exploratory purposes, as previous research suggests that 
conditional reasoning measures and self-reports of similar constructs are often correlated at a 
weak and statistically insignificant level (Bing et al., 2007a; Frost, Ko, & James, 2007; James et 
al., 2004; Wiita, Schnure, & James, 2010). Thus, participants completed the Aggression, 
Achievement, Affiliation, Endurance, Impulsivity, Infrequency, and Order scales from the 
Personality Research Form-E (PRF-E; Jackson, 1974). For experimental purposes, the focus was 
on the PRF-E Aggression scale. The Infrequency scale was used to detect participants who were 
carelessly responding, and to mask the intent of the research. The Achievement, Affiliation, 
Endurance, Impulsivity, and Order scales were included to mask the intent of Study 1.  
Criterion Measure 
Differential Framing of Situational Strength Scale (DFSSS) 
 An indirect measurement system is required because differential framing is an implicit 
cognition (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; James & Mazerolle, 2002; James & McIntyre, 1996; 
James & Rentsch, 2004; LeBreton, 2002; McMahon, 2009). Thus, participants were given the 
impression that they were completing an "adjectives test" about the accuracy with which people 
describe work environments. Presenting this measure as a test of ability is consistent with 
previous research assessing both implicit motives (e.g., James, 1998) and differential framing 
(e.g., LeBreton, 2002; McMahon, 2009). However, the real goal was to assess the correlation of 
motive strength (i.e., the motive to aggress) with various adjectives that can be used to describe 
strong situations. 
 More specifically, participants read a brief description of a work environment adapted 
from the “four facets” of situational strength measure, designed by Meyer, Dalal, José, Hermida, 




adjective" from a list of four possible options. For example, when provided the item stem 
“procedures prevent an employee from working in his/her own way,” participants were asked to 
choose from the following adjectives (see Appendix C for a list of all items):  
TEMPORARY DICTATORIAL BUREAUCRATIC DAZZLING 
Based on previous theorizing (James, 1998; James et al., 2004, 2005), it was expected that PSs 
would frame this environment as “bureaucratic” (a relatively non-hostile interpretation), whereas 
AGs would frame it as “dictatorial” (a more hostile interpretation). Items were developed by the 
author to be consistent with the JMs outlined by James and colleagues (e.g., James, 1998; James 
et al., 2005). After the initial item design, the resultant bank of items was critiqued and adjusted 
by multiple members of two psychological research laboratories, as well as two faculty members 
familiar with both differential framing and situational strength.  
 The final measure was scored the same way as the CRT-A: +1 for each aggressive 
response. All other choices were scored as "0." Also consistent with the CRT-A, the amount of 
"distractor" responses chosen per participant was indexed to eliminate careless respondents from 
the final data sample. This measure yielded five scale scores; one for each of Meyer et al.'s 
(2010) four facets (i.e., the degree of aggressive interpretations of constraints, consequences, 
consistency, clarity, as well as a "positive consequences" scale to be consistent with Study 2). 
Distractor items were also included to prevent the true intent of the measure being revealed. 
Distractor Tasks 
 Distractor tasks were included in an attempt to mask the overall intent of the research 
study. For this measure, participants answered questions such as "name every use for a brick that 





 Participants were told that they were participating in a study designed to investigate 
relationships between personality, cognitive ability, and general knowledge. After providing 
consent, participants completed surveys that included basic demographic information (e.g., age, 
gender, ethnicity), the CRT-A, the PRF-E subscales, the distractor task, and the Differential 
Framing of Situational Strength scale. After completing these measures, participants were 
thanked and debriefed.  
Results  
 A total of three hundred fifty one undergraduates participated in this study. However, the 
dataset was condensed because of evidence of careless or non-sensical responding on the part of 
participants. Specifically, twelve participants were eliminated due to having five or more 
illogical responses to the CRT-A. This is consistent with what is recommended in the manual for 
this assessment (e.g., James & McIntyre, 2000). The threshold of five out of twenty-two CRT-A 
items equates to approximately 23% of the operational CRT-A items. Given the precedent of a 
23% illogical response threshold, this criterion was also applied to the DFSSS scale, a 
conceptually similar measure. That is, for the DFSSS measure, respondents who chose eight or 
more illogical options were removed from the data sample. This resulted in an additional eleven 
respondents having data removed. Further, another fifteen respondents were eliminated from the 
final analysis because their Infrequency scores on the PRF-E were four or above. This is 
consistent with what is recommended in the manual for this assessment (e.g., Jackson, 1974).  
 During the course of data collection, a number of participants informed the experimenters 
that they were aware that the CRT-A was a measure of aggression, not reasoning. This is 




assessment effectiveness (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; James & Mazerolle, 2002; LeBreton 
et al., 2007). Further, these participants also informed the experimenters that they had learned 
about conditional reasoning from their previous coursework in psychology. Thus, an informal 
survey of instructors (i.e., for personality, industrial/organizational, and social psychology 
classes at the Georgia Institute of Technology) was conducted which suggested that conditional 
reasoning is almost universally discussed. Thus, information about participant coursework was 
collected via the demographics form, and any participants who had taken any of the three classes 
noted above were eliminated from the dataset because of their probable exposure to the 
conditional reasoning measurement methodology. This resulted in thirty four additional 
participants being removed from the final analysis. 
 Based on this refined sample, descriptive statistics for all study measures are provided in 
Table 1 on the following page. For a comprehensive correlation table for all study measures, 














Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Study 1 Measures         
        
  Sample 1   Sample 2   
        
Survey N Items Mean SD rxx Mean SD rxx. 
               
         
CRT-A 22 4.26 2.16 .722
^
 4.44 2.26 .705
^
 
        
PRF-E Aggression 16 7.59 3.52 .759 7.57 3.53 .761 
        
PRF-E Infrequency 16 1.33 0.57 N/A 1.30 0.58 N/A 
        
DF Clarity 3 0.55 0.67 .145 0.49 0.64 .348 
        
DF Consistency 3 0.21 0.50 .363 0.39 0.57 .221 
        
DF Constraints 3 1.31 0.74 .071 1.38 0.77 .135 
        
DF Consequences - 
Negative 3 
1.06 0.78 .163 1.01 0.73 .162 
        
DF Consequences - 
Positive  3 0.96 0.71 .076 0.94 0.74 
 
.133 
        
SAT Math 1 683.57 68.53 - 685.64 69.16 - 
        
SR SAT Math 1 703.31 75.08 - 706.43 67.88 - 
        
SAT Verbal 1 634.29 64.74 - 620.23 73.45 - 
        
SR SAT Verbal 1 647.86 67.60 - 640.00 78.27 - 
        
ACT Composite 1 27.00 4.04 - 29.88 3.64 - 
        
SR ACT Composite 1 30.36 3.79 - 30.15 3.10 - 
        
Grade Point Average 1 3.36 0.49 - 3.48 0.43 - 
        
SR Grade Point Average 1 3.37 0.55 - 3.38 .51 - 
                
Note. CRT-A = Conditional Reasoning Test of Aggression; PRF-E Aggression = Personality Research Form-E 
Aggression Subscale; PRF-E Infrequency = Personality Research Form-E Infrequency Subscale; DF Clarity = 
DFSSS Clarity Subscale; DF Consistency = DFSSS Consistency Subscale; DF Constraints = DFSSS 
Constraints Subscale; DF Consequences - Negative = DFSSS Negative Consequences Subscale; DF 
Consequences - Positive = DFSSS Positive Consequences Subscale; SR = Self-Reported; 
^
 = computation of 
reliability reported in James (1998) and LeBreton (2002), all other reliabilities are internal consistency 
estimates. Except for ACT scores, descriptive statistics are based on sample sizes ranging from 100 to 141. 





 Hypothesis 1 proposed a statistically significant, positive correlation between CRT-A 
scores and the Differential Framing of Situational Strength Scale (DFSSS) subscale scores. In 
other words, it was proposed that hostile perceptions of external control (i.e., each of the four 
facets of situational strength) would be positively correlated with the motive to aggress. This 
hypothesis was tested by utilizing a double-cross validation design (e.g., Binning & Barrett, 
1989; James, 1973; LeBreton, 2002). Specifically, the final sample of 284 was randomly split 
into two groups of equal size. In the first group (hereafter referred to as Group 1), correlations 
were computed between the primary predictor, the CRT-A, and all DFSSS subscale items. The 
best three items for each of the five DFSSS subscales were retained. Correlations were then 
computed between the CRT-A and the five three-item DFSSS subscales in Group 1 (i.e., the 
initial validity). Next, correlations were computed between the CRT-A and the same three-item 
subscales in Group 2 (i.e., the cross validity). This same process was repeated using Group 2 as 
the initial validation group, and then utilizing Group 1 as the cross validation group. Results are 





Table 2. Initial and Cross Validities for CRT-A and DFSSS Subscales 
 
   
 Sample 1 Key Sample 2 Key 
     
    
Sample 1 DF Clarity .254
*
 .008 





   
Sample 1 DF Consistency .246
*
 -.006 
Sample 2 DF Consistency -.014 .163 
   
Sample 1 DF Constraints .129 .134 
Sample 2 DF Constraints -.018 .144
†
 
   
Sample 1 DF Consequences - 
Neg .116 .051 




   
Sample 1 DF Consequences - 
Pos .082 -.072 
Sample 2 DF Consequences - 
Pos .100 .132 
      
Note. A statistically significant positive correlation is interpreted as 
support for Hypothesis 1. 
*
 = p < .05; 
†
 = p < .10. Bolded text represents 
the cross validity. Non-bolded text represents the initial validity. Sample 
1 sample sizes range from 139 to 140. Sample 2 sample sizes range 
from 133 to 136. 
 
 Initial validities provide tentative support for the hypothesis that individual differences in 
implicit aggression are positively correlated with hostile interpretations of situational strength. 
All initial validities are in the expected direction and half are statistically significant. However, 
cross validities provide less support for Hypothesis 1, as only one DFSSS subscale cross validity 






 Given the equivocality of results, supplemental analyses were conducted to further 
explore the nature of the obtained findings. First, the variability among CRT-A/DFSSS facet 
correlations was addressed. Initial findings suggest certain situational strength facets may be less 
amenable to the phenomenon of differential framing (i.e., results strongest for consistency and 
clarity, negative consequences and constraints weaker). It is also possible, however, that for 
facets such as constraints and negative consequences, a strong motive to aggress may not be a 
prerequisite for one to draw hostile conclusions about these particular work characteristics. That 
is, many people may draw hostile or negative conclusions about not having control over one’s 
work (i.e., constraints) or being severely punished for mistakes (i.e., negative consequences), 
irrespective of their implicit motive to aggress. Conversely, to frame clear instructions about 
one’s job task in a hostile manner, for example, one must theoretically have a strong motive to 
aggress. Thus, relationships with the motive to aggress may be attenuated due to the overall 
negative nature of the both the constraints and consequences constructs. 
 This was tested empirically. First, as is seen in Table 1, mean scores for constraints and 
negative consequences, in comparison to the clarity and consistency facet scores, are higher. 
Mean scale differences range from .51 to 1.10 higher (p < .001), which for a three item scale, is a 
relatively pronounced difference. These findings support the notion that perhaps constraints and 
negative consequences are generally viewed more negatively, and a strong implicit motive to 
aggress is not a prerequisite for viewing these facets in a hostile manner. This is also consistent 
with the pattern of findings in that stronger CRT-A/DFSSS correlations are observed for the 




 To further examine the differential framing of situational strength, a global situational 
strength score was computed. This was done by combining the five DFSSS facet scores into an 
overall score. This analysis was completed utilizing the double-cross validation mentioned 
above. Results are presented below in Table 3.  
Table 3. Initial and Cross Validities for CRT-A and a Global Situational Strength Score 
      
  Sample 1 Key  Sample 2 Key 
         
       
Sample 1 Global Situational Strength  .297
*
  .030 
Sample 2 Global Situational Strength  .100  .294
*
 
           
Note.
*
 = p < .05. Bolded text represents the cross validity. Non-bolded text represents 
the initial validity.  
The pattern is consistent with findings for individual facets: initial validities support Hypothesis 
1, whereas cross validities do not. In this case, however, initial validities are stronger than what 
was observed for facet-level DFSSS scores.  
 Though the focus for this dissertation is on measurement of the implicit motive to 
aggress, exploratory analyses were conducted with a self-report predictor of aggression: the 











Table 4. Correlations between the PRF-E Aggression Subscale and DFSSS Subscales 
       
   Sample 1   Sample 2   
     PRF-E Agg   PRF-E Agg   
        
DFSSS Clarity  -.060  .050  
       
DFSSS Consistency  -.051  -.099  
       
DFSSS Constraints  .134  .027  
       
DFSSS Neg. Conseq.  .018  .004  
       
DFSSS Pos. Conseq.  .047  .086  
              
       
Affirmative results (i.e., statistically significant positive correlations) were not expected when 
correlating a self-report measure (e.g., the PRF-E Aggression subscale) with an implicit measure 
(e.g., the DFSSS subscales). This expectation was grounded in theory (e.g., James & Mazerolle, 
2002) as well as previous empirical investigations (e.g., LeBreton, 2002, McMahon, 2009). 
Obtained results were consistent with these previous findings.  
Study 1 Discussion 
 The hypothesis that the implicit motive to aggress is positively correlated with hostile or 
aggressive interpretations of situational strength was not unequivocally supported in this study. 
Though initial validities suggest partial support for this hypothesis, the comparatively more 
stringent analysis of cross validities provided only modest support.   
 A number of factors could have contributed to these equivocal findings. For instance, 
given the key "task" of the DFSSS is adjective selection, as well as the large number of non-
native English speakers at the institution where this research was conducted, a plausible 
confound is that the presence of non-native English speakers. This assertion, however, appears 




653.88, SD = 69.71) and non-native English speakers (M = 640.40, SD = 96.28) were not 
significantly different from each other (F = .587, p = .445). Further, there were no statistically 
significant mean differences (F = .002, p = .968) between CRT-A scores for native English (M = 
4.86, SD = 2.42) versus non-native English speakers (M = 4.84, SD = 2.21). The same is the case 
for the number of illogical CRT-A responses selected (F = .013, p = .909), when comparing 
native English speakers (M = .23, SD = .47) to non-native English speakers (M = .24, SD = .52). 
Differences between non-native English speakers and native English speakers for CRT-
A/DFSSS correlations are not reported because sample sizes (e.g., n = 9) are not large enough to 
draw firm conclusions – this is because information about native English speaking was not 
collected from the beginning of the study.  
 Second, it was previously mentioned that some participants were aware that the CRT-A 
was, in fact, not a reasoning test. Concealing the intent of this and other implicit measures is 
essential to measurement and assessment (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; James & Mazerolle, 
2002; LeBreton, 2002). To combat this issue, participants who had a strong likelihood of being 
aware of this instrument – due to coursework – were removed from the dataset (i.e., those who 
had taken personality, I/O, and social psychology courses). However, given the large amount of 
research that is conducted on conditional reasoning at this institution, it is possible that other 
participants were aware of the intent of the CRT-A from participating in other studies. Such 
information was not obtained, and thus, these participants could not be eliminated from the final 
analysis. Further, it is possible that if participants were aware of the intent of the CRT-A, they 
were also able to detect the intent of the DFSSS, given its conceptual and construct similarity. 




 Third, the obtained reliability estimates of key measures (e.g., the DFSSS subscales) are, 
by and large, poor. In fact, it is somewhat surprising results were as positive as they were given 
the reliability estimates noted in Table 1. Further, given that reliability sets the upper bound for 
validity, future iterations of the DFSSS will need to increase respective estimates of reliability to 
maximize opportunities to demonstrate relationships with measures like the CRT-A, as well as 
external criteria (cf., LeBreton, 2002).   
 Fourth, marginal distributions for key variables are inconsistent, which can further 
attenuate or suppress relationships (cf., McMahon, 2009). It should be noted that some of the 
strongest observed relationships occurred where skew statistics between the CRT-A and DFSSS 
subscales were the most similar (e.g., Sample 1: Clarity; Sample 2: Negative Consequences). 
The CRT-A demonstrated skew and kurtosis levels that were reasonably consistent with previous 
research (e.g., James et al., 2005). The DFSSS subscales, however, demonstrate levels of skew 
and kurtosis that are more variable and representative of a measure in early stages of 













Table 5. Skew and Kurtosis Statistics for Study 1 Measures       
         
   Sample 1   Sample 2     
         
Survey Skew SE Kurtosis SE Skew SE Kurtosis SE 
                 
          
CRT-A .620 .205 .288 .407 .720 .208 .943 .413 
         
Clarity 1.104 .204 1.226 .406 3.54 .205 15.635 .407 
         
Consistency 2.366 .204 4.810 .406 .355 .206 -.686 .408 
         
Constraints .294 .204 -.057 .406 .381 .206 -.297 .408 
         
Consequences - Neg. .353 .204 -.254 .406 .974 .206 .810 .408 
         
Consequences - Pos.  .060 .204 -.970 .406 .813 .205 -.318 .407 
         
 
 Given the reliability and distributional issues, a post hoc power analysis was conducted. 
This post hoc power analysis reveals that any observed correlation below the .24 level failed to 
attain more than a .80 power level. Further, for the substantially lower correlations (e.g., the .082 
correlation for the positive consequences facet), power was as low as .15. This is certainly 
problematic, though given the conceptual similarity between the CRT-A and DFSSS, 
correlations were expected to be much higher than the .082 level. 
 Given the potential issues noted above, it should be noted that Hypothesis 1 did not go 
completely unsupported. Further, accounting for the fact that the DFSSS is still in initial 
development stages, portions of these results (e.g., the clarity facet) are quite promising. 
Creating, testing, and validating new items appears to be a fruitful next step within this domain 
of research.  
More specifically, it is posited that future research efforts can expand upon the choice 




measure created by Meyer et al. (in press). While providing a useful starting point for 
investigations regarding the differential framing of situational strength, future research should 
attempt to increase the number, the heterogeneity, and the specificity of item stems. By 
increasing the specificity of item stems, more detailed examples of the four C’s of situational 
strength are available to test differential framing. In its current form, the DFSSS provides item 
stems that are relatively abstract and impersonal, thus potentially lacking adequate context or 
relevance for respondents. By providing more narrow or detailed examples of situational 
strength, the heterogeneity of item stems should also increase. This will improve upon the 
current research because in the present study, item stems were relatively homogenous. This was 
problematic because this limited the number of usable item stems as there were concerns that 
participants would uncover the intent of the measure, or perhaps grow agitated over “being asked 
the same question multiple ways.”  
Another way in which one may build off the present research is to select more subtle 
adjectives, especially for the aggressive responses. That said, some aggressive item choices can 
only be so subtle, and future research should also expand differential framing of situational 
strength investigations to other relevant constructs, such as the achievement motivation/fear-of-







 Study 1 was intended to clarify the degree to which individual difference-based 
psychological meaning is attributed to situational strength. The tentatively affirmative results for 
Study 1 represent a valuable expansion and clarification of situational strength's nomological 
network in its own right. However, it would be even more compelling to demonstrate that 
differential framing translates into actual behavior (i.e., unintended negative outcomes in strong 
situations). 
 To examine the possibility of secondary outcomes in strong situations, the current study 
manipulated the consequences facet of situational strength (Meyer et al., 2010). That is, in the 
experimental condition (i.e., high situational strength operationalized through positive 
consequences), participants were offered a performance incentive on an experimental task (in 
contrast to the control condition, in which no such manipulation is introduced). Focus is placed 
on this particular facet of situational strength for three primary reasons. First, the use of 
performance incentives has a long history in not only the academic literature, but also in human 
capital management practices (e.g., Jacques, Rice, & Hill, 1951; Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, & Shaw, 
1998; Locke, Shaw, Saari, & Latham, 1981) and, as such, increases the ecological validity of the 
manipulation. Second, previous research demonstrates that AGs, in comparison to PSs, have a 
much higher propensity for reacting in a hostile manner to externally imposed situational 
pressures and demands (Bing et al., 2007b; Detert, 2007; Russell & James, 2008; Spector, 2010) 
that they may frame as "coercive" or "bullying" (e.g., James, 1998). Thus, the present 




situational strength. Third, this manipulation provides a parsimonious methodology for a test of 
the differential framing of situational strength. 
Primary Criteria 
 The primary criteria in this study were effort and performance. Effort was measured in 
three distinct ways (described in detail in the "materials" subsection of the Method). Performance 
consisted of a single measure. Based on the experimental manipulation, it was hypothesized that 
higher mean levels of effort and performance (i.e., primary outcomes) would be observed on an 
experimental task in the experimental condition. These hypotheses are based on previous 
research that indicates that behavioral variability on these outcomes may be constrained by high 
situational strength (Henry & Sniezek, 1993; Meyer et al., 2009). Specifically: 
Hypothesis2a: Higher mean effort will be observed in the experimental (i.e., high 
situational strength) condition. 
Hypothesis2b: Decreased variability in effort will be observed in the experimental (i.e., 
high situational strength condition).  
Hypothesis3a: Higher mean performance will be observed in the experimental (i.e., high 
situational strength condition). 
Hypothesis3b: Decreased variability in performance will be observed in the experimental 
(i.e., high situational strength condition). 
Secondary Criteria 
 The secondary criterion in this study was cheating. Previous research indicates that high 
CRT-A scores are associated with a propensity to cheat, especially as a reaction to situational 
manipulations designed to elicit the motive to aggress (Bing et al., 2007b; Russell & James, 




in the high situational strength condition would be more likely to cheat on the experimental task 
(i.e., when a performance reward is offered). It should be acknowledged that in the high 
situational strength condition, all participants had an incentive to cheat on the task. However, 
previous research suggests that not all participants will cheat. That is, those with a strong motive 
to aggress, in comparison to those with a weak motive to aggress, are much more likely to 
engage in this behavior (Bing et al., 2007b; James et al., 2005).  
 In the control or "weak" condition (i.e., no performance incentive), there was 
theoretically much less reason to cheat when compared to the "strong" condition. Though it is 
possible that AGs may cheat at a higher rate than PSs in the control condition, differences for 
this secondary outcome were hypothesized to be much more pronounced in the strong condition. 
Thus: 
 Hypothesis4: Situational strength will moderate the relationship between the motive to 
 aggress and cheating, such that this relationship will be stronger in the experimental (i.e., 
 high situational strength) condition than in the control (i.e., low situational strength 
 condition).  
Differential Framing  
 It is theorized that individuals with a strong motive to aggress engage in antisocial 
behaviors like cheating because they process social information through a prism of dominance 
versus submissiveness, hostile attribution, potential for being victimized, and so forth (James, 
1998). Thus, it was proposed that in the high situational strength condition, individuals with a 
strong motive to aggress would have a higher propensity for framing the situational strength 




subversively gain an advantage). In other words, situational strength will be differentially framed 
in a way that allows AGs to rationalize cheating and ultimately supports their motive to aggress:  
 Hypothesis5: The motive to aggress (as measured by the CRT-A) will correlate positively 
 with aggressive or hostile differential framing of high situational strength. 
It follows that individuals will act in accordance with their framing of situational strength. Thus, 
the way in which situational strength (i.e., induction of the consequences manipulation) was 
interpreted is hypothesized to relate to cheating: 
 Hypothesis6: The differential framing of high situational strength will mediate the 
 relationship between the implicit motive to aggress and secondary outcomes. 
Method 
Participants 
The total number of participants for this study was 392; 201 participants in the 
experimental condition, and 191 participants in the control condition. Because a primary analysis 
in the current study involves testing for moderation, a relatively large sample size was utilized to 
maximize power (Aguinis & Pierce, 1998; Aguinis, Beaty, Boik, & Pierce, 2005; Stone-Romero, 
Alliger, & Aguinis, 1994). Stone-Romero and Anderson (1994) found that a total sample size of 
120 was essentially the minimum number for detecting interactions. For this reason, the current 
study exceeded this threshold to attain adequate statistical power (Aguinis, 1995). Other salient 
factors affecting statistical power include within group correlations between subgroups, as well 
as subgroup proportion sizes. For instance, in their Monte Carlo simulation, Stone-Romero, 
Alliger, and Aguinis (1994) found that power was highest when subgroups were of equal size. 
This study followed the spirit of these recommendations by having a close-to-equal sample size 




between-group differences of within group correlations (i.e., r = .05 for the control group, r = .35 
for the experimental group). In other words, the stronger difference between groups, the higher 
the power. The situational manipulation in this study was intended to result in strong between 
group differences for correlations between predictors and criteria. 
Materials 
Predictor Measures 
 The CRT-A and PRF-E subscales utilized in Study 1 were again utilized in the present 
study. In addition to masking the intent of the present study, the Achievement, Endurance, 
Impulsivity, and Order PRF-E subscales were utilized for analyses regarding primary outcomes 
(e.g., consistent with situational strength theory, the observed r between participants' Endurance 
scores and experimental task effort is expected to be higher in the weak condition than in the 
strong condition).  
Cattell's Culture Fair Test 
 Scale 3, Form A of Cattell’s Culture Fair Test (Cattell, 1973) was utilized as a control 
measure for ability on experimental task performance. This assessment consists of four short 
tests ranging from 10 to 14 multiple-choice items each, for a total of 50 items. On the first test, 
participants are allowed three minutes to complete 13 items where the task is to complete a series 
of incomplete figures. For the second, participants are allowed four minutes to solve 14 items 
where the key task is to identify which two response choices are like, from five possible choices. 
For the third test, participants are allowed three minutes to solve 13 items where the key task is 
to choose one of six possible response choices that best fits a matrix of figures – this part of the 
assessment is very similar to the Raven’s Progressive Matrices Test (Ravin, Court, & Raven, 




items where the key task is to choose the response that replicates a pattern of symbols for each 
item stimulus. Appendix O provides sample items for each test. Cattell’s Culture Fair test has 
demonstrated adequate reliability in previous studies, (e.g., .74; Cattell, 1973) and correlates with 
constructs such as job performance (e.g., Coté & Miners, 2006; Turnage & Muchinsky, 1984), 
academic performance (e.g., Barton, Dielman, & Cattell, 1972), and more relevant to the present 
purposes, experimental task performance (Conway, Cowan, Bunting, Therriault, & Minkoff, 
2002; Engle, Tuhoksi, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999; Smith & Stanley, 1987).  
Experimental Task 
 Cover story. Participants were informed that researchers were testing a new "scoring 
software algorithm" for a reasoning test they developed. In order to "help the researchers validate 
this scoring algorithm", participants completed measures that "allowed the experimenters to 
know something about their individual characteristics" (i.e., the predictor measures outlined 
previously). Participants were under the impression that this scoring algorithm was being piloted 
for the cryptogram assessment (i.e., the experimental task) only.  
 In reality, the primary purpose of this cover story was to provide participants with an 
opportunity to cheat on the experimental task (i.e., cryptograms). That is, for ten of the 
cryptogram items, there was an "all of the above" response option. Participants were asked not to 
choose this option because a scoring glitch results in this response choice being scored "correct" 
every time, even if it is not the correct answer (cf., Russell & James, 2008). See Appendix D for 
verbiage regarding how this was communicated to participants. 
 Primary assessment. The primary assessment consisted of 20 "cryptograms" (see Bing et 
al., 2007a) a task in which participants "de-code" a puzzle by matching characters with 




First, for ten of the 20 total items, participants were asked to choose from four potentially valid 
response options. Second, for the other ten items, participants had four total response options per 
item, where three are potential responses and the final option is "all of the above." Participants 
will be asked not to choose the "all of the above" option because of a "computer glitch" that will 
erroneously score the item as correct (cf., Russell & James, 2008).  
Manipulation Check 
Situational Strength at Work (SSW) Scale 
 Meyer et al. (in press) created a measure of situational strength based on the four facets 
approach outlined by Meyer et al. (2010). Each of the resultant facet scales demonstrated 
acceptable levels of internal consistency: clarity (.94), constraints (.94), consistency (.91) and 
consequences (.89). In addition to showing ample convergent and discriminant validity, these 
authors noted that scores from this scale yielded several effects that were consistent with 
underlying theory. An adapted version of this scale was used as a manipulation check to ensure 
that the high consequences condition was, indeed, viewed as more consequential than the no 
consequences condition by participants. See Appendix L for items. 
Criterion Measures 
Differential Framing 
 Differential framing was assessed under the guise of a memory test. Participants in the 
experimental condition were provided with an item stem (e.g., "The manner in which 
experimental rewards were determined was:"), and were then asked to choose the adjective that 
they perceive as most fitting. For each adjective list, two response choices were nonsensical 
distractors; of the remaining two choices, one reflected an aggressive interpretation (e.g., 




JMs outlined by James et al. (2004). As with Study 1, all Study 2 items were reviewed and 
adjusted by multiple members of two psychological research laboratories, as well as two faculty 
members familiar with both differential framing and situational strength. Distractor items were 
interspersed to prevent participants from uncovering the real intent of the survey (i.e., "The first 
survey you took was a test of:"). This measure was scored the same way as the CRT-A: +1 for 
each aggressive interpretation of situational strength. Items can be found in Appendix H.  
Primary Criteria 
 Performance. Overall performance was measured by the number of cryptogram items 
correctly solved. 
Effort. Because effort is often viewed as one of the most difficult psychological concepts 
to measure (e.g., Ambrose & Kulik, 1999; Kanfer, 1990; Yeo & Neal, 2004), multiple measures 
were utilized to better represent its construct space. First, a measure adapted from work by Fisher 
and Ford (1998), as well as Kanfer and colleagues (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989; Kanfer, 
Ackerman, Murtha, Dugdale, & Nelson, 1994). This nine-item measure was intended to assess 
off-task mental activity (i.e., indicative of a lack effort and devotion of attentional resources); a 
sample item includes "I took 'mental breaks' while working." The Ford & Fisher (1998) measure 
demonstrated a .87 internal consistency reliability and predicted performance on an experimental 
task at a statistically significant level. See Appendix I for a full list of items.  
The second operationalization of effort was adapted from Brown and Leigh's (1996) 
measure of work intensity, which they defined as an employee's "energy exerted per unit of time" 
(p. 362). A sample item includes "When I worked on this experimental task, I really exerted 




reliability, and predicted sales volume (e.g., job task performance) for a sample of salespeople. 
See Appendix J for a full list of items. 
Secondary Criteria 
 Cheating. Cheating was quantified by the number of cryptogram items for which 
participants chose the "all of the above" response option. Again, this is an index of cheating 
because participants will be asked not to choose this option because a computer glitch will score 
this response choice as "correct" irrespective of its correctness.  
Procedure 
 The present study was conducted via secure online software. After giving consent, 
participants provided demographic data and completed all predictor measures. No experimental 
manipulation was introduced until all predictor data were collected. 
 After an experimental manipulation (see two subsequent sections below for details), 
participants completed the cryptogram measure (see Appendix F). There were clear instructions 
as well as two example items to aid participants' understanding of the task. After completing the 
20 item cryptogram measure, participants then responded to two effort surveys. Participants were 
instructed that they should only reference their performance on the cryptogram survey when 
responding to these two surveys. Then, participants completed the SSW as a manipulation check 
to ensure that the experimental condition is perceived as more consequential (i.e., stronger) than 
the control condition.  
 This general procedure was the same for all participants, aside from the differences 






Experimental/High Situational Strength Condition  
 For this experimental manipulation, not only were participants under the impression that 
they were pilot testing an analytic ability assessment, but that the top ten highest performers 
would earn a $30 Visa gift card. Also, for participants in this condition, the final survey 
(presented as a "memory survey") was intended to assess the degree to which situational strength 
is differentially framed. Thus, this survey was comprised of both differential framing items as 
well as distractor items concerning participants' memory of experimental tasks and procedures. 
For instance, when provided with the stem "the use of a performance reward made the 
experiment feel more," participants were to choose from the operational adjectives of 
"competitive" (PS) or "combative" (AG). See Appendix H for illustrative items. 
Control Condition/Weak Situational Strength Condition 
 In this condition there were no positive consequences (i.e., no performance rewards) for 
participants on the experimental task. Participants were simply informed that they were pilot 
testing an analytic ability assessment.  
Results 
Analyses relevant to this study can be usefully divided on the basis of four outcomes of 
interest: the manipulation check, primary outcomes (i.e., effort and performance), secondary 
outcomes (i.e., cheating), and differential framing. Tests of these variables are detailed in the 
following subsections. Comprehensive correlation tables (one for the control condition, one for 








The abridged SSW (Meyer et al., in press) was utilized as a manipulation check. 
Descriptive statistics are provided below in Table 6. 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics for Study 2 Manipulation Check   
 
 
          
  Control Condition  Experimental Condition  
SSW Facet          
   N M SD   N M SD p-value 
           
Clarity  173 7.50 1.95  185 8.29 1.37 < .001 
          
Consistency  172 6.20 1.77  185 7.06 1.93 < .001 
          
Constraints  175 4.70 2.20  185 4.43 2.00 ns 
          
Consequences (Neg.) 172 3.75 1.94  189 4.70 2.26 < .001 
          
Consequences (Pos.) 172 9.01 4.16  185 17.38 2.56 < .001 
                    
Note. The Clarity, Consistency, Constraints, and Consequences (Neg.) scales are based on the 
best two performing items adapted from Meyer et al. (in press). The Consequences (Pos.) scale, 
most relevant to the current study, is based on four total items. 
 
Significant mean differences on the positive consequences facet were expected between 
situational strength conditions. Independent groups t-tests demonstrated mean differences 
between conditions in the expected direction, thereby supporting this expectation. However, 
statistically significant mean differences were also observed for the Clarity, Consistency, and 
Negative Consequences facets. Though somewhat counterintuitive and unexpected, similar 
findings have been noted elsewhere (e.g., Meyer et al., in press). Nevertheless, the positive 







 Hypotheses 2 and 3 concerned the degree to which primary outcomes would differ 
between conditions, presumably due to the experimental manipulation in the strong situation 
condition. Specifically, Hypothesis 2 proposed higher levels of effort and restricted variability in 
the experimental condition. Hypothesis 3 proposed higher performance levels and restricted 
variability in the experimental condition. Table 7 illustrates mean level results that are 
completely consistent with these predictions, though variance results are slightly less consistent. 





         
  Control Condition Experimental Condition  
Primary 
Outcome 
     
 
  
   N M SD N M SD p-value 
          
Cryptogram 
Performance 
201 3.69 2.56 191 4.75 2.48 < .001 
         
Off-Task Mental 
Activity 
168 24.88 6.09 183 23.57 5.84 < .05 
         
Work Intensity 173 18.32 5.90 187 20.78 4.95 < .001 
                  
         
The above results are consistent with situational strength theory in that higher levels of effort and 
performance were demonstrated in the strong condition, at a statistically significant level. It 
should be noted that mean scores for Off-Task Mental Activity are lower in the strong condition. 
This, however, is the expected pattern of means for this measure because this construct 
represents a lack of effort, in other words, or an “effort-inverse” index. Regarding variability, 
Levene’s test of homogeneity of variances shows that, although differences in variability 




Intensity scale demonstrates less variability in the strong condition at a statistically significant 
level (F = 1.42, p < .05). Thus, with regard to mean differences, Hypotheses 2 and 3 were 
supported. With regard to decreased variability between conditions, the pattern of results is 
consistent with hypotheses, but statistical significance is only observed for the Work Intensity 
index of effort.   
 Further analyses were conducted to explore primary outcomes. For instance, correlations 
between personality subscales and primary outcomes were expected to be stronger in the control 
or weak condition (e.g., Beaty et al., 2001; Meyer et al., 2009), Thus, correlational data between 
predictor measures (e.g., PRF-E scales) and primary criteria were computed. Correlational data 
are provided in Table 8 below. 
Table 8. Correlation Between Predictor Variables and Primary Outcomes (By Condition) 
         
  Control Condition  Experimental Condition 
         
 








          





         





         









         




 -.078 -.032 
         
Cattell’s Test  .350
**
 .071 -.171*  .399
**
 -.094 .019 
                  
Note. 
*
 = p < .05; 
†
 = p < .10. Effort 1 = Off-Task Mental Activity; Effort 2 = Work Intensity. 
In the control condition, correlations are based on sample sizes ranging from 122 (Cattell's Test 
sample size) to 173. In the experimental condition, correlations are based on sample sizes 





Although mean results for primary outcomes noted in Table 4 demonstrate results consistent 
with situational strength theory, correlations between self-reported personality characteristics and 
primary outcomes largely do not. In fact, portions of the above data illustrate findings directly 
counter to what is expected by the basic tenets of situational strength theory (i.e., stronger 
correlations between personality and behavior in the strong condition). For this reason, no formal 
tests for moderation were conducted. This is because the correlational data in Table 6 suggest 
that moderated relationships consistent with situational strength theory are not even possible 
(i.e., stronger correlations in the weak condition). This is in contrast to previous investigations 
(e.g., Beaty et al., 2001; Meyer et al., 2009), where initial correlational data were consistent with 
situational strength theory, thereby suggesting that formal tests for moderation should be 
conducted.  
 Due to the nature of the findings reported above, analyses are presented below where 
cognitive ability (e.g., operationalized by Cattell’s Culture Fair Test scores) is controlled. Table 
9 illustrates that findings are largely equivalent with or without cognitive ability controlled, in 
that the observed pattern of results are inconsistent with situational strength theory. 
Table 9. Performance Correlations, Controlling for Ability 
     
Variable   ß   ß 
    Control Condition   Experimental Condition 
     





PRF-E Achievement .015  .110 
PRF-E Endurance .084  -.106 
PRF-E Impulsivity .024  -.131 
PRF-E Order -.113  -.219
**
 
          






 Hypothesis 4 proposed that situational strength would moderate the relationship between 
CRT-A scores and cheating, such that the relationship would be stronger in the experimental 
condition than in the control condition. Results were inconsistent with predictions but consistent 
with extant situational strength theory. That is, CRT-A scores were more closely associated (and 
in the expected direction) with cheating in the weak condition (r = .163, p <. 05) than in the 
strong condition (r = -.087, ns). Due to this difference between correlations, a formal test for 
moderation was conducted. Consistent with recommendations (e.g., Cohen, Cohen, West, & 
Aiken, 2003), CRT-A scores were centered by subtracting the observed mean for each score. 
This centered score was used to compute the interaction term. Resultant analyses indicate that 
situational strength moderated this relationship. More specifically, obtained results were 
inconsistent with what was proposed in Hypothesis 4, but consistent with extant situational 
strength theory. Table 10 shows the results for this moderator analysis. 
Table 10. Moderated Multiple Regression Analysis for Cheating 
Variable 
Entered 
   ß Multiple R R
2
 ∆R2 
       
CRT-A  .038 .038 .001 - 
      
Condition  -.081 .089 .008 .007 
      









            
Note. 
**
 = p < .05. 
 
An interaction plot is provided below in Figure 1. Consistent with previous research (e.g., Frost, 




above and below the observed mean. The lines represent the strong and weak conditions, 
respectively. 
Figure 1. Interaction plot for secondary outcomes. 
 
 
It should also be noted that there were no significant mean differences (F = 1.358, p = .245) 
between cheating scores when comparing the control (M = .687, SD = 1.893) and experimental 
(M = .487, SD = 1.454) conditions. 
 Consistent with findings reported for primary outcomes, results are presented with 
cognitive ability controlled. It was hypothesized that participants would have a less compelling 
reason to cheat when there was no incentive for performance (i.e., the weak condition) as 
opposed to when there was a performance incentive (i.e., the strong condition). It is noteworthy 
that with cognitive ability controlled, relationships between CRT-A and cheating scores are in 







Table 11. Cheating Analyses Controlling for Ability 
     
Variable   ß   ß 
    Control Condition   Experimental Condition 
     





CRT-A .148  -.164
†
 
          
Note. 
†
 = p < .10.  
 
This pattern of findings suggests that to AGs, having one’s performance scored (i.e., the strong 
condition) is akin to having one’s performance “monitored” or “watched.” Thus, AGs appear 
less likely to cheat if they think they may be caught. This pattern of findings has also been 
reported elsewhere (e.g., Brooks, 2010). 
Differential Framing 
Hypothesis 5 stated that one's implicit motive to aggress will be positively correlated with 
hostile or aggressive interpretations of high situational strength. This hypothesis was tested the 
same way as described in Study 1. That is, a zero-order correlation was computed between the 
CRT-A and one's differential framing score. This hypothesis was not supported (r = -.093, ns).  
Hypothesis 6 stated that the differential framing of high situational strength will mediate 
the relationship between the implicit motive to aggress and secondary outcomes (see Figure 2 for 
an illustrative model). The mediation testing approach for untested models lacking previous 
empirical attention (i.e., Ordinary Least Squares regression) advocated by James and colleagues 
(James, 2008; James & Brett, 1984; James, Mulaik, & Brett, 2006) was utilized to test this 







Table 12. Hierarchical Multiple Regression (Mediation) Analysis 
        
Predictor   Step ∆R
2
 SE b p 
               
         
Differential Framing Score 1 .049 .101 .049 ns 
CRT-A   2 .085 .053 -.070 ns 
        
CRT-A   1 .074 .052 -.074 ns 
Differential Framing Score 2 .085 .102 .043 ns 
                
        
Supplemental Analysis 
 To further explore the phenomenon of differential framing of situational strength, 
supplementary analyses were conducted. Though originally intended to assess participants’ 
perceptions of their respective experimental condition (i.e., weak situation, strong situation), the 
manipulation check may also provide a useful criterion for differential framing. This is because 
the manipulation check is focused on how participants perceive the four facets of situational 
strength within the context of the experiment. Thus, correlations were computed between CRT-A 












Table 13. Correlation Between CRT-A and SSW (Manipulation Check) Facet Scores 
        
   Control Condition  Experimental Condition 
SSW Facet Score       
    CRT-A  CRT-A 
         
SSW Clarity  .144
†
  -.065 
        





        
SSW Constraints  -.066  -.080 
        





        





                
Note. 
**
 = p < .01; 
*
 = p < .05; 
†
 = p < .10. 
 
As is seen from the above, the implicit motive to aggress is associated with perceptions of 
situational stimuli (i.e., situational strength), across conditions – providing general evidence of 
differential framing. Of particular note are the findings obtained from both of the consequences 
facet scores (i.e., the focal facet for this dissertation). First, AGs tended to report both conditions 
as having a higher degree of negative consequences. This overall finding may reflect AGs 
propensity to view surrounding social stimuli in a hostile or negative affect-laden way (e.g., 
James, 1998). This relationship is stronger in the experimental condition, suggesting that AGs 
viewed the use of a performance reward (i.e., the key characteristic of the experimental 
condition) as more consequential – in a negative way – than their PS counterparts. Another 
explanation for this finding is that AGs were simply attempting to sabotage the researchers’ 
findings. That is, there is no compelling reason that participants would endorse an item such as 
“for the Cryptogram survey, my decisions had extremely important consequences for other 




Ko, & James, 2007; James et al., 2005), endorsing these items may have been an attempt to 
undermine researchers efforts and skew results.  
Regarding positive consequences, AGs generally reported that their performance would 
be rewarded in the weak condition. Given that there was no mention of a performance reward in 
the weak condition, this finding is somewhat puzzling. Three explanations are put forth. First, 
AGs tend to over-perceive hostile intent, or furtive motives on the part of others (e.g., James, 
1998), and this finding may reflect the fact that AGs were suspicious anticipating deception in 
this experiment (i.e., “there must have been a reward for performance if they are asking about 
it”). Second, this finding may be reflective of rationalization. That is, AGs had just cheated on 
the experimental task, and when given the opportunity endorse items about the positive 
consequences associated with cheating, they did. Third, this finding could simply reflect 
sabotage attempts from AGs. That is, there were clearly no rewards for performance in the weak 
condition, and by indicating that there was indeed a performance reward, AGs could simply be 
attempting to sabotage or skew obtained results for the researchers.   
In the strong condition, there was a significant negative correlation between the implicit 
motive to aggress and perceptions of positive consequences. Two explanations are put forth that 
are conceptually similar to the explanations offered for the findings obtained in the weak 
condition. The first explanation concerns AGs tendency to perceive hostile intent or furtive 
motives on the part of others, or to generally be suspicious (e.g., James, 1998). That is, 
participants (particularly AGs) were offered an opportunity to cheat, but were also told their 
performance would be rewarded (i.e., their performance would be “monitored” or “watched”). It 
is theoretically plausible that AGs, based on the coinciding opportunity to cheat with the notion 




them to cheat.” Thus, the negative correlation between CRT-A and positive consequences facet 
scores may be reflective of AGs’ suspiciousness, or general distrust that there was actually a 
performance reward; they just did not buy the experimental cover story. The second explanation 
is consistent with what has been put forth previously, in that these findings are simply reflective 
of AGs attempts to sabotage research findings.  
Study 2 Discussion 
 Findings from the second study of this dissertation are largely consistent with extant 
situational strength theory, though less consistent with the propositions put forth regarding the 
prospect of differential framing and secondary outcomes of situational strength. Potential reasons 
for this pattern of results are discussed below. 
 The first issue worthy of mention is the data collection methodology and the resultant 
data. Data were collected online. This method was selected because it was theorized that the use 
of undergraduate participants may introduce an important situational strength-relevant confound: 
the Georgia Institute of Technology Honor Code. That is, one of the key criteria in this study was 
cheating, and there were concerns that the Honor Code may deter undergraduates from cheating 
(i.e., the Honor Code functions as situational strength). For this primary reason, an undergraduate 
participant sample was not utilized.  
 This is not to say, however, that online data collection does not pose its own issues (see 
Tippins, Beaty, Drawgow, Gibson, Pearlman, Segall, & Shepherd, 2006 for a comprehensive 
review) that are relevant to the current study, such as cheating (e.g., Beaty, Fallon, & Shepherd, 
2002), anxiety (e.g., Igbaria & Parasuraman, 1989), distractions in un-proctored settings (e.g., 
Shepherd, Do, & Drasgow, 2003), inconsistencies when tests are speeded (e.g., Mead & 




surveys (e.g., Stanton, 1998). More particular to the present study, there were two issues that 
may have resulted in non-optimal data.  
The first is that StudyResponse, who was responsible for managing online data 
collection, first told participants that the duration of the study would last at most 20 minutes. 
This was a strong under-estimation that may have led to participant resentment and/or careless 
responding. Though steps were taken to eliminate careless respondents (e.g., CRT-A illogical 
scores, PRF-E Infrequency scores), these methodologies are not perfect. The other issue that 
became apparent in this online data collection was compensation. Participants were paid $5.00 
USD for their participation, where anecdotal evidence from previous investigations (e.g., Meyer 
et al., in press) indicated that this was reasonable compensation in previous studies. In this study, 
however, anecdotal evidence suggested that this was too low. This may also adversely affect 
participant motivation. These issues are pervasive and have the potential to influence all study 
predictions. Now the focus turns to a discussion of the specific predictions of this study.  
Primary Outcomes 
 Regarding means and variances of primary outcomes, results were largely consistent with 
predictions. However, given these pattern of results, it was expected that correlations between 
PRF-E subscales and primary outcomes would be consistent with previous situational strength 
research (e.g., correlations stronger in weak conditions). This pattern of results was not observed. 
This is potentially (though not likely) a measurement issue, as the PRF-E has not been utilized in 
previous investigations in this area of research. And although confirmative results have been 
obtained with self-report measures of personality previously (i.e., Meyer et al., 2009), issues with 
this approach to measurement are well-noted (James & Mazerolle, 2002; Morgeson, Campion, 




It should also be noted that the experimental task was intended to be correlated with 
ability as little as possible. This, however, was not the observed relationship. It is possible that 
the experimental task was too g-loaded, lacking a substantial association with personality such 
that there were no meaningful or statistically significant differences between conditions – though 
analyses wherein cognitive ability is controlled indicate this is not the case. Future research 
should seek experimental tasks that are less associated with cognitive ability and more associated 
with personality-based decisions to allocate effort.  
Secondary Outcomes 
 Regarding secondary outcomes, it was observed that relationships between CRT-A scores 
and cheating scores were weaker in the experimental (i.e., strong) condition than in the control 
(i.e., weak) condition. These results were inconsistent with predictions, but consistent with extant 
situational strength theory. The observed pattern of results may be due to the fact that 
participants in the strong condition were under a heightened awareness of being monitored 
(especially AGs), because their performance would be scored and potentially rewarded. This 
potential “threat” of being monitored or watched could serve as a deterrent to cheating. Further, 
it is possible that participants may have been under the impression that, should they cheat, they 
would no longer be eligible for the performance reward. Participants in the weaker condition 
may have, therefore, had less justification for thinking their performance was being scored 
and/or monitored.  
Differential Framing 
 One of the key propositions of this dissertation was that situational strength (in this case a 
performance reward) would be differentially framed, based on one’s level of an implicit motive 




population, but three alternate explanations should also be noted. First, item properties are by 
and large, poor. Item characteristics are listed in Table 14 below.  
Table 14. Skew and Kurtosis Statistics for Study 2 Measures, Strong Condition 
           
       
Survey Mean SD Skew SE Kurtosis SE 
             
        
CRT-A 5.13 2.32 .17 .18 -.48 .35 
       
DF Item 1 .11 .31 2.57 .18 4.67 .35 
       
DF Item 2 .05 .23 4.01 .18 14.26 .35 
       
DF Item 3 .16 .37 1.85 .18 1.43 .35 
       
DF Item 4 .12 .33 2.32 .18 3.44 .35 
       
DF Item 5 .04 .20 4.56 .18 18.96 .35 
       
DF Item 6 .12 .33 2.31 .18 3.35 .35 
       
DF Item 7 .07 .25 3.42 .18 9.83 .35 
       
DF Item 8 .14 .35 2.11 .18 2.49 .35 
       
DF Item 9 .49 .50 .06 .18 -2.02 .35 
       
DF Item 10 .04 .20 4.57 .18 19.08 .35 
       
Note. SE = Standard Error. 
 
Thus, there may be a relationship in the population, but the non-optimal item characteristics 
observed (which also contributed to poor observed reliabilities) in this study were unable to 
reveal such an association. Little variability was observed for these items, which may reflect the 
fact that this test lacked face validity and respondents were aware of the intent of the test – which 
is extremely problematic for implicit measurement (e.g., James, 1998; LeBreton et al., 2007). 




Differential framing is usually measured under the guise of an adjective test (cf., 
McMahon, 2009; LeBreton, 2002). In this study, differential framing was assessed under the 
guise of a memory test, a second issue worthy of mention. Though indirect in nature, it is 
uncertain if this particular measurement style engages the same mechanisms present in 
conditional reasoning or an “adjective test.” In other words, previous examinations of differential 
framing are largely logic-based, whereas this approach was memory-based. Determinations 
regarding the relative measurement effectiveness of a “memory test” versus an “adjective test” 
cannot be determined with these data, but is a worthy further investigation. Third (and potentially 
related to the first alternative explanation), are face validity concerns over differential framing 
items. That is, concealing the intent of items, especially those heavily laden with aggressive 
language, is difficult. It should be noted that distractor items were added to maintain face 
validity, but it is possible that participants became aware of the intent of the measure. Thus, 
perhaps future research should use response options that are more subtly shaded toward 









In this dissertation, an expanded approach to situational strength that accounts for the 
potential role of individual differences vis-à-vis differential framing was proposed for empirical 
examination (i.e., exploring both primary and secondary outcomes). Findings obtained in Study 
1 indicate that, to some degree, discrepant psychological meanings are attached to the same 
social stimulus (i.e., situational strength). Further refinement of DFSSS items should strengthen 
this finding. Study 2 focused not only on differential framing, but also the possibility of 
secondary outcomes. Hypotheses for primary outcomes were generally supported, whereas 
hypotheses for differential framing and secondary outcomes were not.  
Given this inconsistent pattern of findings across studies, further research is needed. For 
instance, the results of Study 1 suggest that instances of positive consequences (the manipulation 
utilized in Study 2) demonstrate the least evidence for differential framing. Given that other 
facets appear to be more consistently differentially framed in Study 1 (e.g., clarity), future 
studies employing a specific, behavioral methodology seen in Study 2 should seek to manipulate 
these facets.  
It was also previously noted that developing differential framing items that conceal the 
intent of measurement is difficult (Lawrence James, the creator of conditional reasoning, has 
often quipped that “it is only so easy to hide a hostile attribution bias”). Further, to frame clear 
instructions about one’s job task in a hostile manner, for example, one must have a very strong 
motive to aggress. For a construct such as constraints, on the other hand, a strong motive to 
aggress may not be a prerequisite for one to draw hostile conclusions about this work 
characteristic. Thus, relationships with the motive to aggress may be attenuated due to the overall 




this assertion in that the generally more negative constraints and consequences facets, in 
comparison to the generally more positive clarity and consistency facets, demonstrate higher 
mean facet scores on the DFSSS at a statistically significant level. Because some facets appear 
less amenable to differential framing than others from an implicit motive to aggress paradigm, 
other individual differences constructs should be explored. The achievement motivation/fear-of-
failure constructs appear to be promising candidates to further explore differential framing of 
situational strength.  
Conclusion 
"Stimulus-response" approaches to situational strength explore the ways in which 
behavioral variability is uniformly decreased in strong situations. That is, individuals in strong 
situations may be pressured or even forced (e.g., to avoid losing one's job) to behave in a way 
that nullifies the influence of non-ability individual differences on primary (i.e., intended) 
outcomes. However, research from social-cognitive approaches (i.e., differential framing) 
suggests that different types of people may have different secondary reactions to instances of 
high situational strength. Returning to a previous example, if an individual with a strong motive 
to aggress frames very explicit directions (i.e., high clarity, high situational strength) as 
"domineering" instead of "instructive," it follows that behaviors and attitudes consistent with this 
hostile framing should follow. This proposition was tested but received equivocal support in this 
dissertation, but these mixed findings should not necessarily be interpreted as a complete lack of 
support for the social-cognitive approach. Instead, the contention that situational strength may 
constrain behavioral variability on primary outcomes, while simultaneously serving as a stimulus 
for differential framing and subsequent secondary outcomes, should continue to be tested using 










The extent to which cues regarding work-related responsibilities or 
requirements are available and easy to understand. 
 
Consistency 
The extent to which cues regarding work-related responsibilities or 
requirements are compatible with each other. 
 
Constraints 
The extent to which an individuals freedom of decision and action 
is limited by forces outside his or her control. 
 
Consequences 
The extent to which decisions or actions have important positive 
or negative implications for any relevant person or entity. 






































JUSTIFICATION MECHANISMS FOR AGGRESSION 
Justification Mechanism Definition 
Hostile Attribution Bias Tendency to see malevolent intent in actions of others.  Even 
benign or friendly acts may be seen as having hidden, hostile 
agendas designed intentionally to inflict harm.  An especially 
virulent form of this bias occurs when benign or positive acts 
are attributed to selfish concerns and negative incentives (e.g., 
a helpful suggestion by a supervisor is interpreted by an 
aggressive subordinate as an intentional attempt to demean his 
or her work). 
Derogation of Target Bias An attempt to make the target more deserving of aggression. 
For example, a number of negative characteristics may be 
ascribed to the target (e.g., corrupt, dishonest, evil, immoral, 
underhanded, unethical, untrustworthy). Or, the positive traits 
of the target may be ignored, undervalued, or depreciated 
Retribution Bias Tendency to confer logical priority to reparation or retaliation 
over reconciliation.  Reflected in implicit beliefs that 
aggression is warranted to restore respect or exact restitution 
for a perceived wrong. Bias is also indicated by whether a 
person would rather retaliate than forgive, be vindicated as 
opposed to cooperate, and obtain revenge rather than maintain 
a relationship.  This bias underlies classic rationalizations for 
aggression based on wounded pride, challenged self-esteem, 
and disrespect. 
Victimization by Powerful Others Bias Tendency to frame self as a victim and to see self as being 
exploited and taken advantage of by the powerful (e.g., 
government agencies). Sets the stage for arguing that 
aggression is acting out against injustice, correcting an 
inequity, redressing wrongs, or striking out against oppression.  
Potency Bias Tendency to frame and reason using the contrast of strength 
versus weakness. For example, people with a strong potency 
bias tend to frame others on a continuum ranging from (a) 
strong, assertive, powerful, daring, fearless, or brave to (b) 
weak, impotent, submissive, timid, sheepish, compliant, 
conforming, or cowardly. This bias is used to justify 
aggression via arguments such as (a) aggression (e.g., 
confrontations with teachers, fights with coworkers), which 
results in being perceived as brave or as a leader by others; 
and (b) weakness/submissiveness, which invites aggression 
because it shows that one is willing to submit. 
Social Discounting Bias Tendency to call on socially unorthodox and frequently 
antisocial beliefs to interpret and analyze social events and 
relationships. Disdainful of traditional ideas and conventional 
beliefs.  Insensitive, unempathetic, unfettered by social 
customs. Directly cynical or critical, with few subliminal 
channels for routing antisocial framing and analyses.    






 APPENDIX C 
DIFFERENTIAL FRAMING OF SITUATIONAL STRENGTH ITEMS 
 
Instructions: You will be presented with descriptions of work situations. Following each 
description, there will be four (4) adjectives that may or may not describe the situation. For each 
question, identify the one answer that is most logical or descriptive based on the information 
presented. Sometimes this will require you to cut through answers that look logical or descriptive 
in order to get to the most genuine or "real" answer. Please mark your answers where appropriate 
on the answer sheet. 
 







Frustrating best describes the situation. Frustrating is the best choice because all employees at 











































DIFFERENTIAL FRAMING OF SITUATIONAL STRENGTH ITEMS (continued) 
 




























Coercive+ Constrictive* Fresh Bare  

































DIFFERENTIAL FRAMING OF SITUATIONAL STRENGTH ITEMS (continued) 
 












Commanded+ Structured* Muddy Expensive  
An employee is 
told exactly 
what to expect. 






needs to do to 
succeed. 




how to behave. 
Limiting+ Unambiguous* Exotic  Large 
Expectations 
are very clear. 























Vindictive+ High-stakes* Passive Dry 
Very serious 
consequences 
occur when an 
employee 
makes an error. 






DIFFERENTIAL FRAMING OF SITUATIONAL STRENGTH ITEMS (continued) 
 












subject to harsh 
consequences 
from supervisors. 
Tyrannical+ Stern* Scholarly Homely  
Important 
outcomes are 
influenced by an 
employee's 
actions. 
Punishing+ Meaningful* Round  Small 
Other people are 
put at risk when 
an employee 
performs poorly. 
Manipulative+ Demanding* Stylistic Covered  
Mistakes are 
more harmful 
than they are for 
almost all other 
jobs. 
Disciplinary+ Sobering* Famous Cheap 
Punishments are 
given to those 
who perform 
poorly. 
Vengeful+ Unforgiving* Agreeable Vivacious 
People who 
perform poorly 
are likely to be 
fired.  




Culpable+ Accountable* Romantic Patient 




receive bonuses.  












DIFFERENTIAL FRAMING OF SITUATIONAL STRENGTH ITEMS (continued) 
 












used to get the 
best out of 
employees. 
Coercive+ Motivating* Official Caring 
Employees 
who do not 
perform at the 

















































DIFFERENTIAL FRAMING OF SITUATIONAL STRENGTH ITEMS (continued) 
 












































those who don't 
follow 
directions. 
Reasonable Retro Heavy Hostile 

















Endangered Reliable Redundant Helpless 
 
Work tasks are 
to be 
completed in a 
specific way. 






DIFFERENTIAL FRAMING OF SITUATIONAL STRENGTH ITEMS (continued) 
 








Working long  
hours is 
expected. 






Grand Defunct Ruthless Competitive 








Work tasks are 
structured for 
employees. 











Bare Mundane Playful Orderly 
+ - Aggressive Alternative 
* - Prosocial Alternative 
a
Operational items are provided with the aggressive response first, the prosocial response second, 
and the distractor choices third and forth, respectively. For actual administration, both items and 





CRYPTOGRAM TITLE PAGE (COVER STORY)  
 
Your Next Survey 
 
For the following survey, we are testing a new software scoring algorithm. To encourage you to 
give this survey your full effort so that we have the most valid results possible, we will provide 
a $30 Gift Card to the top ten (10) performers, so please do your best!  
 
Please note this reward is only applicable for your score on the next survey you will take. 
Instructions and background information will follow this page so please read them carefully so 
that you understand what to do. 
 
 
As previously stated, we are testing a new scoring algorithm for the following survey. Please 
note that this survey is still being developed and, therefore, may contain various glitches. For 
example, some internet browsers may incorrectly display some colors, fonts, item formats, etc. 
 
One scoring glitch we have noticed is that choosing the "all of the above" response option may 
lead to the item being scored as "correct" - even if it is not the correct answer. Thus, for the 
following survey, please do not click the "all of the above" response option. 
 
Thank you for your participation thus far. The cryptogram survey is next. If you would like to 
take a break, now would be a good time to do so. Please complete this survey when you are free 
from distractions and may focus on this survey entirely. Once you are ready, please click the next 





CRYPTOGRAM SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS - STRONG CONDITION 
 
The next survey consists of items called "cryptograms." A cryptogram is a puzzle where a word 
or a group of words are coded by substituting each letter in the original word with a different 
letter. The challenge of the puzzle is to 'decode' the letters you see to find the original word or 
words. 
 
Please note that if more than one word is being decoded that the correct response does not have 
to make sense - rather it is just a group of words. See second example below. 
 
For each item, you will be presented with a coded word or group of words. You will then choose 
the correct option from a list of possible choices. A couple of sample items are provided below.  
 
SAMPLE ITEM #1 
 
Coded Word: SPWMTOSS  
 






"EMPLOYEE" is the correct answer because it is the only response that corresponds to the 
original item "SPWMTOSS". For example, "S" in the original word stands for "E" in 
"EMPLOYEE." The letter "S" in the original cannot correspond to any other response choice 
because the word must start with a letter and then end with the same letter twice, like we see in 
the word "employee."  
 
 
SAMPLE ITEM #2 
 
Coded Word: QIRYGIDB DIRY   
 






"HOMEWORK ROME" is the correct answer because it is the only response that corresponds to 
the original item "QIRYGIBD DIRY." For example, "I" in the coded word corresponds to "O", 








Item Type Stimulus 
a
































































































quits sit fit 
tabs taffy 
fast gist  
 
Even fear hairy the wet 
does croke goat must  
 




as true veal 
trod said  
Ache hill is 
liar acts 
lime side  
Ball life is 
even bare 
ever site  
Tire rock of kite tied 








Fight tie fill 























Deal lags craft roof fog 













is yule kale  
Women tick us Nile eras  
TRW LPPE ERW 
QVE CRE KMA 
MAW TUE EVJP 
*Lab feet 
tab sit bat 
run nab lot 
time 
Lap hood 
dap kit pad 








Tab room map kit Pam 















Taffy soul mill failed lead 
told 
 
BGF FGB EIKL 




robe bin sun 
bore will 
real 
Pat tap rose 







Ten net romp lag fig 






grain bye  
Bingo cube 
debit eye  






CRYPTOGRAM SURVEY (continued) 
 












































































guides rail  
Aloha jet 
darken tell  





sale cool  
Teal sour eat 
guilt blue pool  
Must four 
fat melts 
cuts tool  
Shut poor 
pat pinch 
feel cool  
 
YEAUI GHLFS 
























UVEBTBNF *Activity Becoming Campaign Location 
QVLM AENO 
NEO QEO GLG 
OSC 
*Bike fact 
cat bat mom 
try  
Race fast sat 
rat dad tie  
 
Moan ride 






















OUEAI  EUOM  
KHVV TBBS 
TBOM RAUOM 




fat rope pet  
 
Coves voce 











bat hone net 
 
PYRCV PYSX 
XEO MLA VYYK 
VYO IWCOY 
*Depot dear 










hop crone  
Towel tomb 
ban rug loop 
log frown 
 
ITME JSN NSE 
JHA BME GSN 
CFET 
*Heat rug 
gut rip cat 
mug vote 
Feat dug gut 
Dow hat rug 
rote 
Quit ape pet 
alt mat rug 
vote 
Drip the hut 
cow sat tug 
mote 
* - Correct response 
a
Operational items are provided with the correct response first. For actual administration, order 





DIFFERENTIAL FRAMING OF SITUATIONAL STRENGTH ITEMS FOR STUDY 2 
 
Instructions: We are interested in your memory of your participation in this study. On this 
survey, you will be presented with items related to your memory of the study. Following each 





The first thing I read for this experiment was the: 
 
A. PERSONALITY SURVEY 
B. REASONING SURVEY 
C. INFORMED CONSENT 
D. CRYPTOGRAM SURVEY 
 
Informed Consent ("C") is the best answer. This is because this was the first item you read for 






























DIFFERENTIAL FRAMING OF SITUATIONAL STRENGTH ITEMS FOR STUDY 2 – 


































rewards was:   
Unfair+ Unsound* Cordial Humid 




feel more:  
Combative+ Competitive* Passive Dry 









Was a reason to 
win+ 
Was reason to 











me more likely 
to: 
Make sure I got 
what I wanted+ 
Work harder to 
succeed* 
Eat pretzels Take a nap  
Due to the 
performance 
incentive, I felt: 
Normed Coerced+ Lonely Pressured* 
I found the 
prospect of 
missing out on 
an experimental 











DIFFERENTIAL FRAMING OF SITUATIONAL STRENGTH ITEMS FOR STUDY 2 – 








































Prevail+ Persevere* Sleep Draw 
After finding 
out about the 
performance 
reward, I knew 
I must:  
Dominate+ 
 








I was invited to 
participate in 
this study on a: 







30 Minutes 60 Minutes 90 Minutes 120 Minutes 
The survey you 
did not take in 











You began the  
experimental 
session at: 
1pm 10am 11am None of the 
above   
The number of 
personality 
questions was: 
Less than 30 40-60 70-100 101 or greater 
The timeliness 
with which I 
completed this 
session was:  








DIFFERENTIAL FRAMING OF SITUATIONAL STRENGTH ITEMS FOR STUDY 2 – 


















White Beige Maroon None of the 
Above 
I found the 
personality 
survey to be: 
Boring Concerning Musical Enlightening 
I found the 
intelligence 
tests to be: 
Sharp Impossible Easy Challenging 
The cryptogram 
survey was: 
Perfect Undeveloped Imperfect Foolish 
+ - Aggressive Alternative 
* - Prosocial Alternative 
a
Operational items are provided with the aggressive response first, the prosocial response second, 
and the distractor choices third and forth, respectively. For actual administration, both items and 


























OFF-TASK EFFORT ITEMS 
 
We will now ask you some questions about your participation on the cryptogram survey.  
 
Instructions: IMPORTANT! When answering the following questions, please do so thinking 
only about your performance on the cryptogram survey you recently completed. Please DO NOT 
answer with reference to your performance on the other surveys you have completed today.  
 
For this survey, please read each item and indicate the degree to which it is descriptive of your 
performance on the cryptogram survey. That is, choose a number that best represents your 
opinion of your performance (Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree). Please answer honestly so 
that we can better refine our software scoring algorithm; there are not right or wrong answers. 
 
Item Stem 
1. I thought about things that happened in the recent past (last few days). 
2. I used breaks to relax. 
3. I thought about how much time I had spent on this particular survey. 
4. I took "mental breaks" during the task. 
5. I daydreamed while doing the task. 
6. I lost interest in the task for short periods. 
7. I thought about other things that I have to do. 
8. I wondered about how my performance compared with others. 
9. I thought about the difficulty of the task. 





INTENSITY OF EFFORT ITEMS 
 
We will now ask you some questions about your participation on the cryptogram survey.  
 
Instructions: IMPORTANT! When answering the following questions, please do so thinking 
only about your performance on the cryptogram survey you recently completed. Please DO NOT 
answer with reference to your performance on the other surveys you have completed today.  
 
For this survey, please read each item and indicate the degree to which it is descriptive of your 
performance on the cryptogram survey. That is, choose a number that best represents your 
opinion of your performance (Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree). Please answer honestly so 
that we can better refine our software scoring algorithm; there are not right or wrong answers. 
 
Item Stem 
1. I devoted all my energy to getting the Cryptogram/decoding survey done. 
2. When I worked on this Cryptogram/decoding survey, I did so with intensity. 
3. I worked at my full capacity on all of the Cryptogram/decoding survey. 
4. I strived as hard as I could to be successful on the Cryptogram/decoding survey. 
5. When I worked on the Cryptogram/decoding survey, I really exerted myself to the fullest. 

























































 Wonderlic Cognitive Ability Pretest 
 Personality Research Form-E Subscales 
 Conditional Reasoning Test of Aggression 
Criteria: 
 Cryptograms (Primary and Secondary 
Outccomes) 
 Effort Surveys 
Participant Report  













Facet Item Stem 
Clarity For Cryptogram survey, specific information about task-related responsibilities 
was provided.  
For Cryptogram survey, easy-to-understand information was provided about 
requirements.  
Consistency For Cryptogram survey, different sources of task information were always 
consistent with each other. 
For Cryptogram survey, all requirements were highly compatible with each 
other. 
Constraints For Cryptogram survey, I was prevented from making my own decisions.  
For Cryptogram survey, constraints prevented me from doing things my way. 
Consequences For Cryptogram survey, my decisions had extremely important consequences 
for other people. 





For the Cryptogram survey, I had the chance of being rewarded for high 
performance. 
For the Cryptogram survey, I could obtain a performance reward if I performed 
better than other experimental participants. 
For the Cryptogram survey, the best performers are rewarded. 


























CORRELATION TABLE - GROUP 1 
 
Correlational Data for Study 1 Measures - Group 1               
            
Survey 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
                       
             
1. CRT-A -           
            
2. PRF-E (Aggression) -.063 -          
            
3. Clarity .254** -.060 -         
            
4. Consistency .246** -.051 .114 -        
            
5. Constraints .129 .134 .197** .031 -       
            
6. Consequences (Neg.) .116 .018 .302** .257** .002 -      
            
7. Consequences (Pos.) .082 .047 .005 .186** .039 .031 -     
            
8. SAT Math (SR) .034 -.223** .051 .208** .113 .232* -.092 -    
            
9. SAT Math Actual .176 -.282** .000 .300* -.019 .262 -.147 .882** -   
            
10. SAT Verbal (SR) -.130 -.117 -.109 .009 -.135 .010 .164* .049 .049 -  
            
11. SAT Verbal Actual -.258* .022 -.341** .255 -.039 .058 -.063 .113 .117 .881** - 
                        
Note. ** = p < .05; * = p < .10. CRT-A = Conditional Reasoning Test of Aggression; PRF-E Aggression = Personality Research Form-E 
Aggression Subscale; PRF-E Infrequency = Personality Research Form-E Infrequency Subscale; Clarity = DFSSS Clarity Subscale; 
Consistency = DFSSS Consistency Subscale; Constraints = DFSSS Constraints Subscale; Consequences - Negative = DFSSS Negative 
Consequences Subscale; Consequences - Positive = DFSSS Positive Consequences Subscale; SR = Self-Reported. . Except for ACT scores, 
descriptive statistics are based on sample sizes ranging from 100 to 141. ACT scores sample sizes range from 16 (obtained scores) to 60 







CORRELATION TABLE - GROUP 1 CONTINUED 
 
Correlational Data for Study 1 Measures - Group 1 continued               
            
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
                        
            
12. ACT Composite (SR) .187 -.082 -.238* .347** -.032 -.051 .054 .646** .653** .159 .076 
            
13. ACT Composite Actual -.515 -.382 .000 .285 .841** .841** -.276 .560 .441 .767** .788** 
            
14. GPA (SR) .072 -.130 .181* .196** -.056 .266** .035 .410** .025 .075 .056 
            
15. GPA Actual -.046 -.019 .027 .056 -.030 .019 -.346** .460** .403** .139 .178 
                        




CORRELATION TABLE - GROUP 1 CONTINUED 
 
Correlational Data for Study 1 Measures - Group 1 continued 
     
Survey 12. 13. 14. 15. 
          
     
12. ACT Composite (SR) -    
     
13. ACT Composite Actual .668* -   
     
14. GPA (SR) .373** .659 -  
     
15. GPA Actual .370* .831** .138 - 
          




CORRELATION TABLE - GROUP 2  
Correlational Data for Study 1 Measures - Group 2               
            
Survey 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
                       
             
1. CRT-A -           
            
2. PRF-E (Aggression) .169* -          
            
3. Clarity .179** .050 -         
            
4. Consistency .163* -.099 .142* -        
            
5. Constraints .144* .027 .023 .172** -       
            
6. Consequences (Neg.) .217** .004 .081 .098 .098 -      
            
7. Consequences (Pos.) .132 .086 .208** .228** .163* -.005 -     
            
8. SAT Math (SR) .127 .180* .075 .015 .106 .114 .031 -    
            
9. SAT Math Actual .051 .170 .061 -.091 .237 .091 .003 .866** -   
            
10. SAT Verbal (SR) -.047 .203** .081 -.048 -.117 -.100 .171* .274** .370** -  
            
11. SAT Verbal Actual -.426** .039 -.323** -.078 -.147 -.145 .064 .335* .447** .757** - 
            
Note. ** = p < .05; * = p < .10. CRT-A = Conditional Reasoning Test of Aggression; PRF-E Aggression = Personality Research Form-E 
Aggression Subscale; PRF-E Infrequency = Personality Research Form-E Infrequency Subscale; Clarity = DFSSS Clarity Subscale; Consistency = 
DFSSS Consistency Subscale; Constraints = DFSSS Constraints Subscale; Consequences - Negative = DFSSS Negative Consequences Subscale; 
Consequences - Positive = DFSSS Positive Consequences Subscale; SR = Self-Reported. . Except for ACT scores, descriptive statistics are based 




CORRELATION TABLE - GROUP 2 CONTINUED 
 
Correlational Data for Study 1 Measures - Group 2               
            
Survey 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
                        
            
12. ACT Composite (SR) .032 .078 .038 .177 -.003 .134 .089 .657** .269 .600** .538** 
            
13. ACT Composite 
Actual .037 -.707* -.430 .208 .208 .028 .138 .630 .637 .913** 
.740* 
            
14. GPA (SR) .050 -.009 -.080 .027 -.029 .107 .055 .288** .004 .022 .064 
            
15. GPA Actual -.020 .108 -.101 -.277* -.042 .119 -.033 .315* .365** .162 .161 
                        




CORRELATION TABLE - GROUP 2 CONTINUED 
 
 
Correlational Data for Study 1 Measures - Group 2 continued 
Survey 12. 13. 14. 15. 
          
     
12. ACT Composite (SR) -    
     
13. ACT Composite Actual .981** -   
     
14. GPA (SR) .312** .573* -  
     
15. GPA Actual .159 .383 .162 - 
          





























WEAK (CONTROL) CONDITION CORRELATIONS 
 
Correlational Data for Study 2 Measures - Control Group 1 
            
            
Survey 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 
                       
             
1. CRT-A (.722)           
            
2. PRF-E Achievement .016 (.647)          
            
3. PRF-E Aggression .108 -.171** (.733)         
            
4. PRF-E Endurance -.142* .506** .183** (.670)        
            
5. PRF-E Impulsivity -.024 -.194** .369** -.231** (.681)       
            
6. PRF-E Order .039 .215** -.075 .215** .238** (.881)      
            
7. Cattell's Culture Fair 
Test 
.056 .361 -.478 .065 -.355 -.002 (.833)     
            
8. Cryptogram 
Performance 
.125* -.030 -.013 .009 -.086 -.069 0.513** (.692)    
            
9. Cryptogram Cheating .151** .012 .200** .040 .141* .000 .060 -.031 (.926)   
            
10. Off-Task Effort .092 -.086 .229** -.133 .159** -.072 -.651** -.108 0.03 (.673)  
            
11. Work Intensity .054 .108 -.036 .050 
-
.196** 
.213** .214 -.195** .340** -.049 (.954) 
                        
Note. ** = p < .05; * = p < .10. Reliabilities reported along the diagonal in parentheses. CRT-A = Conditional Reasoning Test of 




STRONG (EXPERIMENTAL) CONDITION CORRELATIONS 
 
Correlational Data for Study 2 Measures - Experimental Group              
             
Survey 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. .12 
                         
              
1. CRT-A (.666)            
             
2. PRF-E Achievement -.122* (.618)           
             
3. PRF-E Aggression .166** -.209** (.744)          
             
4. PRF-E Endurance -.230** .566** -.219** (.659)         
             
5. PRF-E Impulsivity .104 -.143* .407** -.192** (.685)        
             
6. PRF-E Order .178** .121* -.093 .032 -.282** (.894)       
             
7. Cattell's Culture Fair 
Test 
.316** -.089 .167 -.077 .102 -.067 (.857)      
             
8. Cryptogram 
Performance 
.036 .045 -.027 -0.016 -.132* -.164** .527** (.662)     
             
9. Cryptogram Cheating -.083 .085 -.076 .067 -.070 .115 -.225 -.183** (.880)    
             
10. Off-Task Effort -.004 -.169** .180** -.225** .222** -.078 -.235 -.217** .064 (.694)   
             
11. Work Intensity -.020 .150** -.071 .136* -.106 -.032 .058 .399** .091 -.169** (.947)  
             
12. Differential Framing -.093 -.033 .219** .098 .215** -.103 -.056 -.028 .045 .054 -.073 (.354) 
                          
Note. ** = p < .05; * = p < .10. Reliabilities reported along the diagonal in parentheses. CRT-A = Conditional Reasoning Test of Aggression; PRF-E 





Figure 2. Comprehensive model for the differential framing of situational strength with primary 
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(refers to the model wherein 
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strength mediates the relationship 
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